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ABSTRACT
Recent uprisings over the failure to hold police officers responsible for
killing civilians—from Ferguson, Missouri to nationwide George Floyd protests—show the importance of excessive force as a social problem. Some
scholars have launched racial critiques of policing as resulting from explicit or
implicit racial bias. Others blame the United States Supreme Court’s permissive excessive force doctrine. This Article is the first to demonstrate that an
intersectional analysis of both race and class helps explain both aggressive
policing and the Court’s deference.
A key contribution of this Article is to reveal several takeaways from intersectionality theory’s basic insight that unique senses of self-identity and
unique stereotypes form at places where categories of identity meet. First,
seemingly distinct identities, such as race, gender, class, and so on, mutually
construct one another such that, for example, racial discourses both influence
and are influenced by gender discourses. Second, the categories of identity
correspond with systems of social power, such as racism, sexism, classism, and
so on. Third, those systems also intersect with and mutually construct one another, resulting in interlocking hierarchies of identities. Fourth, an individual’s
social location—where they are in the map of categories of identity and systems of social power—interacts with social institutions, such as policing, in
ways that exacerbate or ameliorate oppression. Considering the interactions
between social locations and social institutions is an undertheorized aspect of
intersectionality theory. This Article thus applies intersectionality theory to
better understand how race and class come together to produce police excessive force.
This Article’s new insight is to use intersectionality theory to connect the
scholarly literature on class that critiques the Western neoliberal economic order to the scholarly literature on police excessive force. Neoliberalism includes
these components: (1) economic deregulation; (2) emphasis on individual re* William S. Boyd Professor of Law and Director, Program on Race, Gender & Policing,
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sponsibility; (3) slashing welfare; and (4) expansion of punitive apparatuses. It
has created a “centaur state,” which, like the mythological creature, is a
comely human on top and a beast on the bottom. The centaur state is easy on
the top of society through economic deregulation and emphasis on individual
responsibility; however, neoliberalism’s economic deregulation and dismantling of the social safety net leaves behind a vulnerable population known as
the “precariat.” The centaur state is hard on the bottom of society, as it seeks
to push most of the precariat into low-wage, low-security jobs by slashing welfare and to incapacitate the remainder by increasing incarceration. The neoliberal economic order’s need to incarcerate the precariat thus led to
aggressive new forms of policing.
This Article argues that three phenomena found by intersectional analysis
of race and class help explain disparate policing of poor black and brown
neighborhoods versus that in rich white neighborhoods. First, the post-Warren
Court has cooperated with a neoliberally inspired politics of law and order by
deregulating the police through, inter alia, permissive excessive force doctrine.
Second, the “new policing”—aggressive intrusions based on predictive data to
prevent rather than solve crime—applies the aggressive “warrior cop” mode in
poor black and brown neighborhoods and the more protective “guardian officer” mode in rich white neighborhoods. Third, the potential for excessive
force that inheres in warrior policing is what enhances boundaries between
“good” and “bad” neighborhoods, whites and certain racial minorities, and
the rich and the poor. In light of these linkages and dichotomies, this Article
calls for further intersectional studies of policing that consider class as an
equal factor with race, among other identities.
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INTRODUCTION
President Barack Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing
makes a useful distinction between “warrior” cops and “guardian” police officers.1 The warrior cop views himself2 “as a crime-fighter battling evil.”3 He is the “thin blue line” between good people and bad
ones.4 He emphasizes physical control of suspects.5 He is more prone
to use violence.6 The guardian police officer sees herself as a protector
of the constitutional rights and dignity of civilians.7 She emphasizes
verbal persuasion.8 She uses procedural justice—transparent explanations for her actions9—to convince civilians to comply.10 This Article
will explore the underappreciated role of incentives to reinforce the
class structure in explaining why poor black11 and brown neighborhoods get warrior policing.12
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESITASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 1 (2015) (“Law enforcement culture should
embrace a guardian—rather than a warrior—mindset to build trust and legitimacy both within
agencies and with the public.”); see also Kyle McLean, Scott E. Wolfe, Jeff Rojek, Geoffrey P.
Alpert & Michael R. Smith, Police Officers as Warriors or Guardians: Empirical Reality or Intriguing Rhetoric?, 37 JUST. Q. 1096, 1097 (2020) (distinguishing warrior and guardian mindsets);
Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 611, 612 (2016) (defining warrior cop).
2 There is some debate over whether female cops are less prone to violence. See, e.g.,
Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department’s Board of
Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 585 (2001) (proposing, inter
alia, hiring more female police in response to police beating of Rodney King).
3 McLean et al., supra note 1, at 1097; accord Stoughton, supra note 1, at 612.
4 Stoughton, supra note 1, at 635.
5 See McLean et al., supra note 1, at 1101.
6 See Stoughton, supra note 1, at 634.
7 See id. at 614.
8 See McLean et al., supra note 1, at 1097.
9 The following are key elements of procedural justice: “(1) how much voice and opportunity to be heard the party believes she has experienced, (2) neutrality of the forum, (3) the
trustworthiness of the decisionmaker, and (4) the degree to which the individual has been
treated with dignity and respect.” Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural
Justice in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 135 (2011).
10 See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 1, at 10 (calling
for procedural justice in internal and external police methods). The guardian police officer is
thus “more likely to partner with the community, emphasize communication rather than physical
control during officer-citizen encounters, and view their authority as based on the consent of the
public.” McLean et al., supra note 1, at 1097; see also Stoughton, supra note 1, at 614 (defining
guardian officer).
11 I do not capitalize “black.” Although race is socially constructed, which suggests capitalizing all races to highlight that they have no biological meaning, race also has profound material
effects in society, so it is “real” enough to not be capitalized. I usually discuss “black and brown
people” because Latinx and some Asian-Americans in urban areas are policed at rates approaching the targeting of blacks.
12 In short, “class” is an identity created by the economic structuring of society that in1
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As an example of how class works with race to influence the nature of policing,13 compare the practices in Summerlin, Las Vegas with
those on the Westside of Las Vegas.14 Summerlin is much more white
and much richer than Las Vegas as a whole, while the Westside is
much more black and brown and much poorer than Las Vegas as a
whole.15 In Summerlin, the police are relatively invisible; on the Westvolves a person’s sense of who they are as a worker and consumer, and is expressed through
behaviors such as dress, speech, and what one buys. See Angela P. Harris, Theorizing Class,
Gender, and the Law: Three Approaches, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 38 (2009) (using similar concept). See generally Laura T. Kessler, Getting Class, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 915 (2008) (critiquing inattention to class in feminist legal theory); Lisa R. Pruitt, The Women Feminism Forgot:
Rural and Working-Class White Women in the Era of Trump, 49 U. TOL. L. REV. 537 (2018)
(discussing whiteness and class intersectionally). Class is simultaneously material and symbolic.
See Harris, supra, at 38. The material component is the way resources, such as money, are distributed. See id. Class is thus the result of our capitalist commitments to the unequal distribution
of goods based on market forces. See id. at 37. The symbolic component is the way social relations are represented. See id. at 38–39. Class thus differentiates kinds of laborers with varying
degrees of public affirmation for their work. See id. at 39–40. Class is also an identity in that it
influences how we see ourselves, how we are seen by others, and the ways we can negotiate
between those perceptions, or, perform our identities. See Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy
Cooper, Intersectional Cohorts, Dis/ability, and Class Actions, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293,
326–34 (2020) (distinguishing facets of identity); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The
Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 708 (2001) (discussing, inter alia, “identity intersectionality”). See Monica Bell, Stephanie Garlock & Alexander Nabavi-Noori, Toward
a Demosprudence of Poverty, 69 DUKE L.J. 1473 (2020) for a different type of interjection of
class into jurisprudence; namely, the argument for a democracy-expanding perspective that
learns from poor people.
13 I define “policing” as surveillance and control of civilians on behalf of the state. Policing
is usually rationalized as addressing crime. It is ultimately directed by elites and ostensibly assented to by a large segment of society. It also seems that some people—the white middle- and
upper-classes—deem the police to be acting specifically on behalf of their property and particularly against certain populations—the poor as well as black and brown people.
14 A caveat is in order: this Article is a theory piece, not ethnography. I do not conduct a
thick analysis of the social dynamics in these communities nor use detailed statistical analyses to
drive my conclusions.
15 Compare Race and Ethnicity in Summerlin North, Las Vegas, Nevada (Neighborhood),
STAT. ATLAS, https://statisticalatlas.com/neighborhood/Nevada/Las-Vegas/Summerlin-North/
Race-and-Ethnicity [https://perma.cc/ZA4Q-6VSE] (describing demographics of Summerlin),
and Household Income in Summerlin North, Las Vegas, Nevada (Neighborhood), STAT. ATLAS,
https://statisticalatlas.com/neighborhood/Nevada/Las-Vegas/Summerlin-North/Household-Income [https://perma.cc/Y7ZN-WZX8] (detailing Summerlin household incomes), with Race and
Ethnicity in West Las Vegas, Las Vegas, Nevada (Neighborhood), STAT. ATLAS, https://statisticalatlas.com/neighborhood/Nevada/Las-Vegas/West-Las-Vegas/Race-and-Ethnicity [https://
perma.cc/J28J-DU4J] (describing demographics of West Las Vegas), and Household Income in
West Las Vegas, Las Vegas, Nevada (Neighborhood), STAT. ATLAS, https://statisticalatlas.com/
neighborhood/Nevada/Las-Vegas/West-Las-Vegas/Household-Income [https://perma.cc/5DGRJL43]. See also Race and Ethnicity in Las Vegas, Nevada (City), Stat. Atlas, https://statisticalatlas.com/place/Nevada/Las-Vegas/Race-and-Ethnicity [https://perma.cc/97S4-WVSU] (detailing demographics of City of Las Vegas); Household Income in Las Vegas, Nevada (City),
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side, the police are ever-present and stop civilians for jaywalking.16
This visible presence, or absence, of police in neighborhoods is one
aspect of disparate policing.
Disparate policing can have tragic consequences. For instance, a
fifty-year-old unarmed black man, Byron Williams, was stopped on
the Westside by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department in the
early morning for riding a bike at night without a proper light.17 The
Terry stop of Williams for lack of a bike light is the type of policing
that happens to residents of the Westside but not to residents of Summerlin. On this occasion, Williams fled briefly, then surrendered and
was suffocated to death.18 Legal scholars have suggested that disparate
police excessive force stems from doctrinal flaws19 or racial bias.20 This
STAT. ATLAS, https://statisticalatlas.com/place/Nevada/Las-Vegas/Household-Income [https://
perma.cc/9MXW-M5VM] (reporting household income in the City of Las Vegas).
When I moved to Summerlin from Cambridge, Massachusetts, I wondered, “Where the
heck are the police?” I came from a racially and economically heterogeneous neighborhood
where we saw the police all the time. In Summerlin, people often speed 60 miles an hour in a 45
mile-per-hour zone in a residential area—no police. This relative absence of police is not the
only way the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department acts as guardians in Summerlin; they
are also more prone to provide assistance in Summerlin in ways that are absent from the warrior
policing on the Westside. Note that these are my observations as a resident of Las Vegas; many
people agree with me, but I did not conduct an empirical study of policing here.
16 A police officer who was a neighbor in Summerlin reported that he frequently Terrystopped people for jaywalking on the Westside so that he could run warrant checks on them. A
Terry stop, or stop and frisk, refers to a police officer’s brief detention, questioning, and limited
search or pat down of a person for a concealed weapon when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968). Neither a warrant nor probable cause is required for a Terry stop. Id. On pretextual stops
and warrant checks, see generally Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996) (allowing
pretextual intrusions), and Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016) (absolving constitutional
violations followed by discovery of a warrant).
At the conference preceding this symposium issue, socio-legal scholar Monica Bell challenged the idea that the only difference between policing in rich white neighborhoods and poor
black and brown neighborhoods is the absence of policing in the former. I am aware that police
are often quite present in rich white neighborhoods, though in ways that reinforce the privilege
of those residents. My point is that in Las Vegas, and likely elsewhere as well, one primary means
of privileging residents of rich white neighborhoods is the absence of pervasive surveillance and
intrusions.
17 Rio Lacanlale, Review Examines Death of Man in Police Custody Who Said, ‘I Can’t
Breathe,’ L.V. REV.-J. (Oct. 2, 2020, 4:39 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/crime/homicides/
review-examines-death-of-man-in-police-custody-who-said-i-cant-breathe-2134932/ [https://
perma.cc/4LGE-JY8H].
18 Id.
19 See, e.g., Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-Escalation, Preseizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 637 (criticizing
state use-of-force statutes that focus solely on the honesty or reasonableness of an officer’s beliefs, and proposing model statute on police use of deadly force that requires a fact finder to
consider whether the officer engaged in de-escalation measures and whether any conduct of the
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is the first piece to show how incentives created by the class structure
have influenced politics, doctrine, and police behavior in ways that
exacerbate the problem.21
Intersectionality theory is the scholarly approach that will help us
understand how class combined with race lead to warrior policing in
poor black and brown neighborhoods. Many scholars would say that
intersectionality theory is the most important development in the social sciences over the last thirty years.22 Yet there is surprisingly little
legal scholarship applying intersectionality theory to policing.23
Intersectionality theory is based on the insight that unique senses
of self-identity and unique stereotypes form at places where identities
officer increased the risk of a deadly confrontation); Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman,
Constitutional Interpretation Without Judges: Police Violence, Excessive Force, and Remaking the
Fourth Amendment, 105 VA. L. REV. 425, 427 (2019) (discussing the Court’s endogenous analysis
of use-of-force policies, which assumes their reasonableness, then constitutionalizes their standards); Megan Quattlebaum & Tom Tyler, Beyond the Law: An Agenda for Policing Reform, 100
B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (2020) (debunking the Court’s factual description of police work as
involving “split-second judgments” (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989))).
20 See Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the
Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1529 (2016) (identifying some causes of police excessive force
against blacks); see also Jeffrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and Reasonableness in Police
Killings, 100 B.U. L. REV. 951, 961 (2020) (reporting study finding that black suspects are more
than twice as likely to be killed by police than are persons of other racial or ethnic groups, even
controlling for numerous factors).
21 But cf. Aya Gruber, Commentary, Policing and “Bluelining,” 58 HOUS. L. REV. 867, 894
(2021) (likening police focus on black neighborhoods to bank redlining); Nirej Sekhon, Police
and the Limit of Law, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1711, 1736 (2019) (asserting rise of “preventive
policing” shows police’s goal of controlling broadly defined “dangerous classes”); Ahmed A.
White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law’s Uncertain Fate in Modern Society,
37 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 759, 828 (2005) (arguing capitalism’s creation of social marginality is increasingly being addressed through social control rather than social welfare).
22 Intersectionality theory has grown from being considered by some to be a subfield of
feminist theory or black feminist critique of antiracist politics to a broad field of its own that
provides perspective on myriad aspects of the social world, not least of which are race, gender,
sexuality, gender identity, class, and so on. See generally PATRICIA HILL COLLINS & SIRMA
BILGE, INTERSECTIONALITY 1–2 (2d ed. 2020) (discussing intersectionality theory’s impact).
23 But see Carbado, supra note 20, at 1514–15 (discussing masculinity effects on policing);
Ann C. McGinley, Policing and the Clash of Masculinities, 59 HOW. L.J. 221, 242–62 (2015)
(applying masculinities studies to police violence against men of color); Frank Rudy Cooper,
“Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671 (2009) (applying masculinities studies to Terry stops and frisks); Eric J. Miller,
Police Encounters with Race and Gender, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 735, 736 (2015) (stating goal of
considering impact of identities on policing); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 115, 131–35 (2014) (applying masculinities studies to psychological study of police violence); Symposium, Race and Gender and Policing 21
NEV. L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 2021) (collecting intersectional analyses of policing); Symposium,
Overpoliced and Underprotected: Women, Race, and Criminalization, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418
(2012) (collecting discussions of police treatment of women of color).
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such as race, gender, and class intersect.24 Among the implications of
that insight is that supposedly distinct identities mutually construct
one another—for example, racial discourses both influence and are
influenced by gender discourses.25 Another important thing to note is
that categories of identity correspond with systems of oppression, such
as racism, sexism, classism, and so on. Moreover, those systems also
intersect and mutually construct one another, resulting in interlocking
hierarchies of identities.26 This Article’s version of intersectionality
theory thus emphasizes that an individual’s social location—where
they are in the map of identities and systems of oppression—at a given
time in a given context interacts with social institutions, such as policing, in ways that exacerbate or ameliorate oppression.
This Article’s signature insight is that the United States’s shift toward a neoliberal political-economic order created a “centaur state”27
24 See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (critiquing employment discrimination law’s failure to recognize
black women’s intersectional position); PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, INTERSECTIONALITY AS CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY 23 (2019) (arguing for thinking of intersectionality theory as a “critical
social theory in the making”). Elsewhere, I have explicated the ways that masculinities—the
gender performances traditionally associated with cisgender men—exacerbate police-civilian
tensions. See Cooper, supra note 23, at 675 (defining masculinities in light of policing). Police
officers, including women, may feel they have to prove their masculine esteem by aggressively
controlling situations and punishing disrespect. But civilians may sometimes feel they too have
to project masculine esteem by resisting domination. Meanwhile, often under the hashtag
#SayHerName, scholars have pointed out that women of color are disproportionately victims of
police violence, not just black men. See ANDREA J. RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE 2 (2017).
Further, rampant police sexual assaults of cisgender and trans women are a form of excessive
force. Because race and gender are imbricated in one another, an analysis of racially disparate
policing must recognize the racially engendered intersectional influences on police-civilian
encounters.
25 See Patricia Hill Collins, Intersectionality’s Definitional Dilemmas, 41 ANN. REV. SOCIO.
1, 2 (2015) (“The term intersectionality references the critical insight that race, class, gender,
sexuality, ethnicity, nation, ability, and age operate not as unitary, mutually exclusive entities,
but as reciprocally constructing phenomena that in turn shape complex social inequalities.”);
HILLARY POTTER, INTERSECTIONALITY AND CRIMINOLOGY 76 (2015) (canvasing meanings of
intersectionality theory and concluding “intersectionality perspective and intersectionality theory
denote the supposition (perspective) or proposition (theory) that individuals have multiple intertwined identities that are developed, organized, experienced, and responded to within the context of the social structure and its dis/advantaged ordering”).
26 See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 218 (2d ed. 2009) (referring to
a “matrix of domination”).
27 See Loı̈c Wacquant, The Wedding of Workfare and Prisonfare in the 21st Century: Responses to Critics and Commentators, in CRIMINALISATION AND ADVANCED MARGINALITY 243,
252 (Peter Squires & John Lea eds., 2012) (explicating “centaur state”). As sociologist of crime
and poverty Loı̈c Wacquant says, “[T]he expansion and glorification of the police, the courts and
the penitentiary are a response not to crime trends but to the diffusion of social insecurities . . . .”
Id. at 237.
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that spawned “law and order” politics,28 judicial deregulation of the
police,29 and a “new policing”30 aimed at boundary management between “good” and “bad” neighborhoods.31 Neoliberalism has at least
these four features: (1) economic deregulation; (2) an emphasis on a
culture of individual responsibility; (3) cutting welfare; and (4) expansion of punitive apparatuses.32 The United States is now a neoliberal
centaur state in that, like the mythical creature, it is humane on top
and a beast on the bottom.33 The centaur state is friendly to the top of
society through deregulation of markets and emphasizing individual
responsibility, but it tramples on the bottom of society through limiting welfare and hyper-incarceration.34 Because the centaur state produces a “precariat”—those whose lives are made precarious by low
wage jobs that lack security of position—it must generate ways to supervise and control the precariat, such as through aggressive
policing.35
The centaur state pushes policing toward the warrior mode in
three steps. First, the post-Warren Court cooperates with a neoliberally inspired politics of law and order by deregulating the police
28 See Frank Rudy Cooper, A Genealogy of Programmatic Stop and Frisk: The Discourseto-Practice-Circuit, 73 U. MIA. L. REV. 1, 47–53 (2018) (analyzing “law and order” discourse).
29 In providing advice on this piece, Seth Stoughton, professor of law, criminology, and
criminal justice, pointed out that the police may never have been fully “regulated.” I note that
the Court used to at least make gestures toward regulating police behavior.
30 See Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 422–40 (2000)
(describing emergence of preventive, proactive, and data-driven policing strategies that currently
predominate); see also Jeffrey Fagan & Elliott Ash, New Policing, New Segregation: From Ferguson to New York, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 33 (2017) (linking prevalent use of fines and fees for
social control to “new policing”). The features of the “new policing,” being about twenty years
old, are not really “new,” but describe the premises of most contemporary policing.
31 Professor of law and sociology Monica Bell uses a similar concept. See Monica C. Bell,
Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 696–98 (2020) (describing “techniques of border patrol”). I emphasize that when police are in warrior mode, they maintain boundaries, both
literally and figuratively, by what they do at borders and what they do within poor black and
brown communities.
32 See Peter Squires & John Lea, Introduction: Reading Loı̈c Wacquant—Opening Questions and Overview, in CRIMINALISATION AND ADVANCED MARGINALITY 1, 6 (Peter Squires &
John Lea eds., 2012).
33 See LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR 43 (2009) (defining centaur state).
34 See id. For more on hyper-incarceration, and why “it is crucial for scholars to start referring to so-called ‘mass incarceration’ as ‘hyper-incarceration,’ ” see Frank Rudy Cooper, Hyperincarceration as a Multidimensional Attack: Replying to Angela Harris Through The Wire, 37
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 67, 67–68 (2011). See also Loı̈c Wacquant, Racial Stigma in the Making
of America’s Punitive State, in RACE, INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUES 57, 59 (2008),
for an argument that “mass incarceration” is better characterized as “hyper-incarceration
of . . . lower-class black men.”
35 See Squires & Lea, supra note 32, at 1, 2.
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through, inter alia, permissive excessive force doctrine.36 Second, the
“new policing”—aggressive intrusions based on predictive data to prevent rather than solve crime—applies the warrior cop mode in poor
black and brown neighborhoods and the “guardian officer” mode in
rich white neighborhoods.37 Third, the potential for excessive force
that inheres in warrior policing is what enhances boundaries between
“good” (rich and white) and “bad” (poor and black or brown)
neighborhoods.38
Part I of this Article describes the problem: the Court’s deregulation of the police enables police use of excessive force. That Part
traces how the Graham v. Connor39 doctrine absolves police of liability for almost all uses of force. Part II intervenes in current scholarly
approaches to police excessive force. Section II.A shows that critical
race theories of excessive force doctrine are useful40 but do not alone
account for police boundary management of neighborhoods. Section
II.B then proposes that policing scholars adopt intersectionality theory as a means of understanding how race and class mutually construct one another by means of policing.41 Part II closes by introducing
the theory of the neoliberal centaur state as having a big influence on
policing. Part III demonstrates the utility of an intersectional approach that highlights both race and class. Section III.A suggests a
theory of Court deregulation of the police as an explanation for excessive force doctrine.42 Section III.B explains how the tendency of “new
policing” to produce a warrior mindset is mutually constructed by
both race and class. Section III.C considers why police use their powers of excessive force43 to manage boundaries between rich white
See infra Section III.A (providing theory of Court’s deregulation of the police).
See infra Section III.B (showing how race and class mutually construct policing
practices).
38 See infra Section III.C (concluding police manage boundaries between rich white neighborhoods and poor black or brown ones).
39 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
40 For discussions of policing of racial minorities as social control of disfavored groups, see
the following sources: Bell, supra note 31, at 673, 695, 744; I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy,
and Testifying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 840 (2008); Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to
Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV.
125, 130 (2017); Cooper, supra note 28, at 25.
41 See Stewart Chang, Frank Rudy Cooper & Addie C. Rolnick, Race and Gender and
Policing, 21 NEV. L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 2021), for a discussion of the mutual construction of
race, gender, and policing.
42 See infra Section III.A; see also Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 1998 (2017) (discussing emergence of Court deference to
police).
43 Professor Stoughton refers to these as police powers of violence. See Seth Stoughton,
36
37
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neighborhoods and poor black and brown ones.44 Part IV addresses
some potential objections and identifies some implications of this
analysis.
A caveat is in order. This Article does not conduct a comprehensive review of every way the intersectionality of race and class affects
policing. It does not, for instance, collect evidence on how the police
treat poor whites or rich blacks. Its goal is more modest: to start a
conversation about the intersectional analysis of class, race, and policing through a discussion of excessive force.
I. THE COURT’S ACCEPTANCE

OF

POLICE EXCESSIVE FORCE

A key factor in disparate policing in rich white neighborhoods
versus poor black and brown communities is that United States Supreme Court doctrine grants police excessive discretion, which the police use differently in different places. The Court practically
encourages disparate policing with its excessive force rulings. Section
I.A begins by suggesting that the criminal procedure revolution survived in some forms into the mid-1980s, when the Court sought to
regulate police uses of force in Tennessee v. Garner.45 Section I.B reviews the Court’s deregulation of excessive force in 1989’s Graham
and 2007’s Scott v. Harris,46 which created a nearly impenetrable barrier to plaintiffs’ claims.47 Section I.C discusses the recent use of Graham and Scott to de facto overturn Garner.
A. Garner’s More Protective Approach
To understand the Court’s current approach to police use of
force, it is important to note that the Court has abandoned a more
constraining rule for police shootings, which had been set down in the
Garner case.48 In Garner, white policeman Edward Hymon saw a fivefoot-four, fifteen-year-old black child fleeing a house that had likely
How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police Violence, 70 EMORY L.J. 521, 524
n.10 (2021).
44 This is, therefore, a structural argument. See Wendy A. Bach, Poor Support / Rich Support: (Re)viewing the American Social Welfare State, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 495, 500 (2017) (“Turning
the inquiry toward the structures (rather than the actors) helps us move past notions of intentional discrimination and toward a way to unmask systems that privilege some and subordinate
others.”); Carbado, supra note 20, at 1482–83 (calling for seeing police violence as a structural
phenomenon).
45 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
46 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
47 See Lee, supra note 19, at 641–53 (naming key cases).
48 Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12.
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been robbed.49 The officer called out “police, halt,” but Garner started
to scale a fence and Hymon figured that if he got over the fence, he
would escape.50 Hymon shot Garner in the back of the head, killing
him.51 A Tennessee law empowered Hymon to take Garner’s life as
part of using “all the necessary means” to prevent any felon’s escape.52
In the ensuing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the district court twice absolved Hymon of responsibility, but the court of appeals eventually
reversed.53
The Garner Court’s first step was to abandon the prior four-part
substantive due process test.54 Instead, it declared that the Fourth
Amendment addresses how seizures are made, not just when they may
be made55 because “one of the factors” in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing test “is the extent of the intrusion.”56 The Court
next showed that deadly force was inappropriate on these facts.57 It
stated that shooting people just to deter others from attempting to
escape is unjustified,58 especially because a majority of police departments across the nation barred use of deadly force on nonviolent potential felons.59 The Court then stated a rule:
Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer
and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to
apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do
so. . . .
. . . Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the
officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to
Id. at 3–4, 4 n.2.
Id. at 4. Hymon said that his partner was “late coming around” and Hymon was too
slow to catch Garner. Id. at 4 n.3.
51 Id. at 4. Hymon also used hollow point bullets, id. at 6, which are especially deadly, see
Robin Coupland & Dominique Loye, The 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets: A Treaty Effective for More than 100 Years Faces Complex Contemporary Issues, 85 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 135, 135, 137–39 (2003).
52 Garner, 471 U.S. at 4 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982)).
53 Id. at 5–6.
54 See id. at 7–8.
55 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (barring “unreasonable” searches and seizures, and
requiring “probable cause” for issuing warrants). My point here is not that Garner was really a
substantive due process case, but that substantive due process was at that time enough of a
possibility as a framework for police uses of force that the Court had to begin by disavowing that
potential framework.
56 Garner, 471 U.S. at 8.
57 Id. at 9–11.
58 Id. at 9–10.
59 Id. at 10–11.
49
50
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prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect
threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable
cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the
infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm,
deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and
if, where feasible, some warning has been given.60
One would think that rule should apply to all excessive force cases.61
The Garner rule could have had several sanguine effects of police
trigger-happiness. First, it appears to prohibit shooting someone just
to stop them from escaping. After all, the burglary committed in Garner is sometimes thought to be a serious crime. At common law, it
could be the basis for the death penalty.62 Nonetheless, the Garner
Court required independent indicia of a threat.63 Second, the rule implies that even suspects who pose a threat may not therefore be killed
unless that threat reaches the potentially high bar of being a “serious”
threat.64 Third, it implies a default “deadly weapon” rule because it
requires a threat by a “serious” means.65 Fourth, even when a shooting
is justified, the Garner holding values life by suggesting that, when
feasible, a warning should be given before shooting someone.66
Although the Court has sometimes treated the Garner opinion
with respect, its rationale is almost totally undercut by the Graham
reasoning.67 We know that the future Graham and Scott cases are not
just distinguishments of nondeadly force cases from the Garner situation because Graham essentially adopts Justice O’Connor’s approach
in her Garner dissent.
B. Graham and Scott as a Stealth Overturning of Garner
In Graham, a black Charlotte, North Carolina police officer initiated an investigative stop simply because the black eventual-plaintiff,
Id. at 11–12.
Some suggest that Garner was strictly a rule for deadly force cases. My point is that,
when the Garner rule was created, it was not clear it could not be applied to all use of force
cases, which is why many lower courts used it as a general rule. See W. Kip Viscusi & Scott
Jeffrey, Damages to Deter Police Shootings, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 758 (contending Scalia’s
interpretation of Garner “upend[ed] years of precedent and understanding of Garner by claiming that Garner did not establish a rule”).
62 See, e.g., CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA P. HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
401 (4th ed. 2019) (referring to death penalty for all felonies).
63 See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12.
64 Id. at 6, 10–11.
65 See id. at 11–12 (referring to threat “with a weapon”).
66 Id.
67 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) (noting Garner-type seizureby-death as exception to blanket acceptance of pretextual bases for actions).
60
61
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Graham, had quickly entered and left a convenience store.68 The officer was told that Graham was having a “sugar reaction,” but he proceeded to hold Graham and call for backup.69 When Graham exited
his vehicle and passed out, a group of police officers physically abused
him, resulting in a broken foot and bruised forehead, and also denied
him access to needed sugar.70 Eventually realizing he was telling the
truth, the officers returned Graham to his home.71 Graham sued, and
the district court and court of appeals concluded that as a matter of
law, the above behavior did not constitute excessive force.72
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, cites Garner when,
in three sentences, he dismisses the possibility that Graham could also
have a substantive due process claim.73 He then deceptively invokes
Garner for the rule that the reasonableness balancing test takes into
account the “severity” of the crime, whether the suspect is an “immediate threat” to the police or others, and whether they are resisting or
evading arrest.74 The Rehnquist opinion references pages eight and
nine of Garner, but those pages make no explicit mention of “severity” of the crime as a factor.75 That idea actually comes from Justice
O’Connor’s Garner dissent, which asserts the balancing test weighed
in favor of letting Hymon shoot Garner in the back of the head to
prevent escape because of “the serious nature of the crime.”76 This
Article thus considers the Graham opinion to be a stealth overturning
of the Garner decision.
Importantly, Justice Rehnquist’s Graham opinion also inserts two
poison pills into the reasonableness balancing test. First, reasonableness, though theoretically objective, is judged from a police officer’s
perspective.77 This element waters down the test, as the classic reasonable person test assumes a typical person with none of the characteristics of the party in question.78 Thus, Justice Rehnquist’s test is actually
68

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 389 (1989).

69

Id.

70

Id. at 389–90.

71

Id. at 389.

72

Id. at 390.

73

Id. at 395.

74

Id. at 396.

75

See id.; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S 1, 8–9 (1985).

76

Garner, 471 U.S at 26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

77

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

See LEE & HARRIS, supra note 62, at 360–62 (discussing reasonable person test). Preeminent legal scholar Cynthia Lee has pointed out to me that one could argue a reasonable police
officer standard really should be a higher standard than a reasonable person standard because
78
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an objective-subjective test.79 Justice Rehnquist also slides in a conclusory and unsupported statement that the balancing test must therefore always make “allowance” for the speed with which officers
sometimes make decisions.80 The speed of decision factor is also from
Justice O’Connor’s Garner dissent.81
The Graham Court’s second poison pill is the assertion that
courts must ignore any actual bad motivations for police officers’ actions. Citing his insidious United States v. Robinson82 opinion, which
spawned the Whren v. United States83 pretext and racial profiling rule,
Justice Rehnquist asserts that even an officer’s “evil intentions” cannot make an action constitutionally unreasonable.84 This contradicts
our common sense understanding of what is reasonable. If a teacher
lawfully docks a student’s grade, but only because of an improper purpose—such as to punish the student for disagreeing with her or to
induce the student to do something for him—we would have no
trouble calling that action “unreasonable,” even though it was permissible. Yet the Graham test bars any consideration of the officer’s actual motivations. The combined effect of requiring objective
reasonableness while judging it from an officer’s perspective and in
disregard of the officer’s motivations is to tip the scales heavily against
finding police misconduct.
We can also see that Graham is a stealth overturning of Garner in
Justice Rehnquist’s use of references to Garner to bury that older
case. His statement of the rule clearly contradicts Garner’s holding.
Garner downplayed the significance of the decedent being suspected
of burglary, required a “serious” threat not just an “immediate” one,
and flatly barred seizure-by-death to avoid escape in certain situations
the average police officer is trained in the use of deadly force and therefore should be able to
discern more accurately when there is a true threat.
79 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 18.05(A), at 225–29 (8th ed.
2018) (discussing standard in People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986)). Some refer to viewing
a situation objectively and yet simultaneously from the police officer’s point of view as “subjective objectivity.” See, e.g., SETH W. STOUGHTON, JEFFREY J. NOBLE & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT,
EVALUATING POLICE USES OF FORCE 86 (2020).
80 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.
81 See Garner, 471 U.S. at 23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasizing “difficult, split-second decisions police officers must make”); see also id. at 26 (assuming uses of deadly force necessarily involve “swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer” (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968))).
82 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). In Robinson, the Court declared that
the search incident to arrest power includes a bar on considering the officer’s state of mind. See
id. at 236.
83 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
84 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-6\GWN603.txt

1466

unknown

Seq: 15

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

9-DEC-21

12:30

[Vol. 89:1452

rather than making both resistance and escape “factor[s].”85 In that
sense, Graham’s treatment of Garner bears some resemblance to Justice Rehnquist’s “upholding” of the Miranda v. Arizona86 rule in
Dickerson v. United States87 while saddling the Miranda rule with decisions that explicitly sought to undermine it.88 After Graham, one is
technically protected from a few specific forms of excessive force, but
the doctrine is actually useless in most cases.
Today, the Court analyzes police excessive force under the Scott
approach.89 The Scott case adopted the Graham rule that a claim of
excessive force when seizing a suspect must be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard.90 The
Scott decision, however, further skews the reasonableness analysis
against police misconduct claims by adding a culpability analysis and
encouraging courts to judge the facts in advance of a jury trial.91
The key fact in Scott is that there was a police video of the plaintiff, Victor Harris, speeding away from pursuing police cars.92 The lead
police officer got supervisor permission to “take him out.”93 The lead
officer then applied his push bumper to plaintiff’s car, throwing the
car off the roadway and down an embankment.94 This rendered the
plaintiff a quadriplegic.95
The result turned on an evaluation of the video. The federal district court and Eleventh Circuit judges denied the defendant summary
judgment on grounds that, viewing the facts in a light most favorable
to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find a constitutional viola85

Compare Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12, with Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Court required police warnings about the right to
silence and right to counsel before custodial interrogation. See id. at 444–45.
86

87 530 U.S. 428 (2000). In Dickerson, the Court declined to find that Miranda warnings
were a subconstitutional rule. Cf. id. at 441.
88 See Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 33–36
(2001) (treating Dickerson as a stealth overturning of Miranda).
89 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007) (concluding the videotape of a police chase
of speeding vehicle required summary judgment against plaintiff).
90

Id. at 381 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 388).

Id. at 384, 386. Importantly, the Scott Court rejected Victor Harris’s argument that it
should follow Garner, “recasting Garner as simply an application of Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing rather than a bright-line rule for police officers contemplating the use of
deadly force against a fleeing felon.” Lee, supra note 19, at 648.
91

92

Scott, 550 U.S. at 375–78.

93

Id. at 375.

94

Id.

95

Id.
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tion.96 The Court would not stand for that. Justice Scalia held that the
plaintiff’s endangerment of innocent bystanders required summary
judgment in the deputy’s favor as a matter of law.97 Relying on the
video of the chase, the Court found there was no “genuine” dispute
about the facts.98
For the Scott Court, a police misconduct case is simply about
whether the officer’s “actions were objectively reasonable” under the
balancing test.99 Here, the Scott Court concluded that there was a
strong law enforcement interest because the videotape showed the
plaintiff to have been an “actual and imminent threat” to hypothetical
pedestrians,100 other civilians, and the police.101 The Court construed
the victim’s interests to be weaker here because this involved only a
“high likelihood” of death that fell short of the “near certainty” in
Garner.102
The Scott Court goes on, though, to make two points that are
particularly damaging to the future of excessive force claims. First, it
says the balancing test should take into account the “culpability” of
the parties.103 This view slants excessive force analysis decidedly in the
aggressive police officer’s favor, as they will often be dealing with
someone whom they could at least reasonably have believed to be a
felon. A suspected felon will always be “culpable” to some degree,
thus undermining their claim.
Second, the Scott Court encourages resolving excessive force
cases prior to trial. The Court laid down a rule: “A police officer’s
attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens
the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth AmendId. at 376.
Id. at 372.
98 Id. at 380.
99 Id. at 381.
100 Id. at 384. Such pedestrians would be strolling next to or crossing a two-lane highway in
the “dead of night.” Id. at 379; accord id. at 389–91 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the video
as showing little danger, including no pedestrians). Ultimately, the videotape in Scott is to blame
for these dangerous assumptions about reasonableness. As preeminent scholar of law and film
Jessica Silbey says, “In Scott v. Harris, the Court fell victim to the widespread and dangerous
belief—to the degree of enshrining this belief in our national jurisprudence—that film captures
reality.” Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER &
CLASS 17, 18 (2008) (critiquing judiciary’s uncritical use of video in police misconduct cases). It is
a strange and dubious proposition for appellate courts to overturn a district court’s determinations of the state of the facts on the basis of the appellate court’s independent opinion of a
videotape.
101 Scott, 550 U.S. at 384.
102 Id.
103 Id.
96
97
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ment . . . .”104 Such a categorical presumption that chase cases should
be dismissed prior to trial is a big step. Ironically, many police departments memorialize their determinations that it is unwise to conduct
high speed car chases at all, let alone in the dangerous manner of the
Scott case.105 As we will see, the Court listens to the police when their
policies determine their own actions to have been reasonable but upholds officers’ actions even when they violate internal police
regulations.106
C. The Problem
This Part of the Article has argued that Graham and Scott stealthily overturned Garner’s more strenuous review of police excessive
force. That Garner has effectively been overturned is established by
looking at one of the Court’s cases that declined to extend Garner, as
well as numerous lower court cases that acknowledge that Garner no
longer guides analysis. First, in Mullenix v. Luna,107 the Court’s per
curiam opinion suggests that Garner applies very differently in different factual situations.108 The opinion describes Garner as a “general”
test that is “mistaken.”109 That is not exactly what the Court had said
earlier.110 With its language in Mullenix, the Court gave the impression
that Garner had been overturned without actually making that
declaration.
Lower federal courts have picked up on the fact the Court has
covertly overturned Garner. For instance, in Johnson v. City of Philadelphia,111 the Third Circuit went so far as to say the Scott opinion
“abrogates our use of special standards in deadly-force cases and reinId. at 386.
See Hugh Nugent, Edward F. Connors, III, J. Thomas McEwen & Lou Mayo, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., NCJRS 122025, RESTRICTIVE POLICIES FOR HIGH-SPEED POLICE PURSUITS
(1990) (noting proposed policies of U.S. Department of Justice).
106 See infra Section II.A (reviewing critiques of excessive force doctrine); see also
Obasogie & Newman, supra note 19, at 431 (revealing judicial deference to police determinations of reasonableness); Ayesha Bell Hardaway, The Supreme Court and the Illegitimacy of
Lawless Fourth Amendment Policing, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1193, 1201 (2020) (asserting that the
Court, “by dismissing police procedures and rules as ‘trivialities,’ ” “prioritized fulfilling its role
in the War on Drugs over rigorously evaluating law enforcement conduct with an eye to protecting individuals from erratic conduct not supported by police training or administrative rules”
(quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996))).
107 577 U.S. 7 (2015) (per curiam).
108 Id. at 13.
109 Id. at 13 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam)).
110 See Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199 (per curiam).
111 837 F.3d 343 (3d Cir. 2016).
104
105
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states ‘reasonableness’ as the ultimate—and only—inquiry.”112 That
negation of Garner is consistent with the Court’s Mullenix language.
The problem created by the de facto overturning of Garner in
Graham and Scott is that the Court seems to have given permission to
the police to use excessive force. It is easy to read those cases as taking a “hands off” approach to police uses of force. As will be detailed
in Section III.A of this Article, the Graham and Scott cases show that
the Court has deregulated police excessive force. And, as Section
III.B of this Article will discuss, there is good reason to believe that
the “new policing” has led police officers to act as warriors in poor
black and brown communities. The Court’s deregulation of the police
enables police uses of excessive force for that purpose.
II. CLASSING UP POLICING SCHOLARSHIP
The preceding explication of what the Court did to excessive
force doctrine leads to the question of why the Court has deregulated
the police with respect to excessive force. Certainly, theories abound
as to that answer. Racial critiques are especially useful here, as both
the police and the courts may share historic and ongoing explicit and
implicit bias with the general population.113 Section II.A of this Article
reviews those critiques. Section II.B argues for an intersectional approach to studying policing that could analyze the impact of the overlap of categories of identities. Section II.C proposes that
understanding the incentives created by the neoliberal centaur state
through an intersectional approach will help us better understand
policing.
A. Racial Critiques
To understand how race in particular influences police decisions
to use excessive force and the Court’s acquiescence thereto, this SecId. at 349.
Implicit biases have been found to be:
• 1. Pervasive;
• 2. Strong in magnitude (as compared to explicit biases, measured by anonymous selfreports and put onto the same statistical units);
• 3. Related to, but not the same as, explicit biases that are introspectively accessible but
may be shielded from public view; and
• 4. Predictive of behavior in real-world circumstances.
Jerry Kang, Rethinking Intent and Impact: Some Behavioral Realism About Equal Protection, 66
ALA. L. REV. 627, 629–30 (2015) (footnotes omitted); see also Michael Selmi, The Paradox of
Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New Narrative, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 193, 198 (2018) (arguing “the
current rigid dichotomy between explicit and implicit bias seems a peculiarly inapt description of
contemporary discrimination”).
112
113
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tion considers whether race provides the “why” of differentiated policing in Summerlin versus the Westside of Las Vegas. Some
background on the racial dynamics in Las Vegas will be helpful. Summerlin is functionally a white suburb on one end of the highly diverse
City of Las Vegas while the historic Westside of Las Vegas is where
black people have tended to live. Summerlin was a 25,000-acre tract of
land to the west of Las Vegas bought in 1952 by Howard Hughes.114
Beginning in 1991, it was developed as a group of planned communities.115 The communities are mostly gated and are clustered around
commercial malls.116 In contrast, the Westside is a typical urban community that developed ad hoc over the last hundred years.117 It became the black neighborhood in the 1930s, when the City’s white
leaders forced black businesses to move there as a condition of licensure.118 It is where famous black entertainers stayed while they performed for whites in the resorts of Las Vegas, which were racially
segregated well into the 1960s.119
The continuing effects of race in Las Vegas are seen in the present demographics of Summerlin and the Westside. Summerlin South,
a Census recognized neighborhood, is about 68% white, 13% Asian,
11% Hispanic/Latino, and 5% black.120 The growing Summerlin North
area has a slightly higher percentage of blacks but is still basically a
white neighborhood.121 Meanwhile, the Westside is about 44% black,
39% Latino, 9% white, and 4% Asian.122
114 Amanda Finnegan, Summerlin: Past and Present, L.V. SUN (Aug. 18, 2008, 3:54 PM),
https://lasvegassun.com/news/2008/aug/18/summerlin-past-and-present/ [https://perma.cc/5ZDLMSC2].
115

See id.

116

See id.

See Claytee D. White & Peter Michel, How the Westside Began, DOCUMENTING AFR.
AM. EXPERIENCE L.V., http://digital.library.unlv.edu/aae/westside-history-spotlight [https://
perma.cc/WD87-BWA8].
117

118

See id.

See Question of the Day, ANTHONY CURTIS’ L.V. ADVISOR (Apr. 26, 2018) https://
www.lasvegasadvisor.com/question/vegas-segregation/ [https://perma.cc/89Q9-U39V] (describing
Las Vegas as “the Mississippi of the West”).
119

120 See QuickFacts: Summerlin South CDP, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/summerlinsouthcdpnevada [https://perma.cc/5H9X-BRRQ].
121 Summerlin North is about 63% white. See Race and Ethnicity in Summerlin North, Las
Vegas, Nevada (Neighborhood), supra note 15.

See Race and Ethnicity in West Las Vegas, Las Vegas, Nevada (Neighborhood), supra
note 15. The City of Las Vegas as a whole is about 44% white, only 33% Hispanic/Latino, 12%
black, and 7% Asian. See QuickFacts: Las Vegas City, Nevada, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/lasvegascitynevada [https://perma.cc/QA3Q-WV5B].
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Summerlin feels white because it is more than 20% whiter than
Las Vegas as a whole.123 It is also almost 30% less black and Latinx
than Las Vegas.124 More important, Summerlin is figuratively white.
Blacks, Latinx, and Asian-Americans who live in Summerlin are relatively assimilated, even before considering that the racial minorities
here are financially relatively well off. Though it is statistically less
white than some neighborhoods in the East and Midwest, Summerlin
is perceived to be white. Perhaps the difference in policing between
Summerlin and the Westside is a function of race.
A basic fact requires inquiry into the racial dimensions of police
excessive force: blacks and, to a lesser extent, Latinx, are statistically
significantly more likely to be shot dead by the police than whites.
Professor of law and epidemiology Jeffrey Fagan and lawyer Alexis
Campbell document that problem in their recent article, Race and
Reasonableness in Police Killings.125 They studied 3,993 reported police killings and found that blacks were as much as 1.25 times as likely
to be killed by police as whites.126 Latinx were 1.29 times as likely to
be killed by police as whites if neither armed nor having a mental
health issue.127 But Latinx were statistically significantly less likely
than whites to be killed if only armed, and they were roughly equally
likely to be killed when only having a mental health issue or both
armed and having a mental health issue.128 Although the authors
break down many permutations of the data, they clearly conclude that
being black is a significant factor in police killings and that being Latinx is sometimes so.129 Consequently, the costs of deadly uses of force
“may fall disproportionately on nonwhites in a variety of contexts during encounters with the police.”130
Many scholars have explored the ways racial bias affects police
excessive force. Some scholars point to explicit bias, such as the pervasive police belief that racial minorities are especially crime-prone.131
See supra notes 121–22 and text accompanying note 120.
See supra notes 121–22 and text accompanying note 120.
125 Fagan & Campbell, supra note 20, at 961.
126 See id. at 990–92.
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 See id.
130 Id. at 1001.
131 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1543 (2014) (noting police
belief that blacks are crime-prone); cf. Liyah Kaprice Brown, Officer or Overseer?: Why Police
Desegregation Fails as an Adequate Solution to Racist, Oppressive, and Violent Policing in Black
Communities, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 757, 764 (2005) (stating that “some Black
123
124
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This bias is reflected in police targeting of black and brown communities. A prime example is Floyd v. City of New York,132 in which a federal district court found as fact that the New York City Police
Department (“NYPD”) had a policy and practice of targeting young
black and Latinx men for investigative stops.133
Critical race theorist, criminal procedure scholar, and law professor Devon Carbado complicates the question of whether Fagan and
Campbell’s results are the product of explicit bias by focusing on
“blue-on-black violence” as a structural phenomenon.134 To him, the
key is that social forces lead to increased police contacts with blacks,
which in turn exposes blacks to more police violence. Professor
Carbado’s six-part model of the causes has the following components:
(1) social forces, including broken windows policing and racial stereotypes, result in greater police surveillance and contact with blacks;
(2) the very frequency of police contact increases blacks’ risks of experiencing excessive force; (3) police culture and training encourages
excessive force; (4) legal actors then shield that violence as justified;
(5) qualified immunity and indemnification mean officers very rarely
face personal consequences for excessive force; and (6) this structure
means individual officers are disincentivized from exercising care.135
Though Professor Carbado discusses both explicit and implicit bias in
selecting individual suspects, the starting point of the process is intenscholars contend that Black-on-Black crime outweighs the harm of police-on-Black crime, and
thus believe that the police must have broad discretion in order to combat crime in Black neighborhoods”). But see William Wilbanks, The Myth of a Racist Criminal Justice System, 3 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 88, 93 (1987) (claiming that evidence of racism in the criminalization system is
weak and contradictory).
959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 562, 603.
134 Carbado, supra note 20, at 1483.
135 See id. at 1483–84. I emphasize the gender element of Professor Carbado’s formulation.
As Carbado acknowledges, policing is hypermasculine as an institution. See id. at 1514–15 (discussing masculinity effects on policing); see also Cooper, supra note 23, at 675–76 (applying
masculinities studies to Terry stops and frisks); McGinley, supra note 23, at 242–62 (applying
masculinities studies to police violence against men of color); Richardson & Goff, supra note 23,
at 131–35 (applying masculinities studies to psychological study of police violence). Carbado
locates hypermasculinity as primarily a problem of police culture, i.e., as a tendency to be violent
that is trained into officers. See Carbado, supra note 20, at 1514. I would also locate it as a social
force that encourages police interactions. Police officers seek out certain targets because they are
young, black or brown, and male on the theory that these are the most likely criminals. See, e.g.,
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 560, 562 (noting young black and brown males were much more likely
to be stopped and frisked). Police officer hypermasculinity is also linked to officers’ decisions to
make contact with civilians for the purposes of sexual assault. See Carbado, supra note 20, at
1498–502 (discussing Officer Daniel Holtzclaw’s sexual assaults); see also RITCHIE, supra note 24
(documenting pervasiveness of police sexual assaults).
132
133
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tional targeting of black and brown neighborhoods.136 Further explicit
bias can be seen in the use of conservative sociologist James Q. Wilson’s broken windows theory,137 which spawned the Floyd approach
and contemporary preventive policing.138
Other scholars link selective enforcement more directly to implicit bias, such as unconscious stereotypes that blacks are more dangerous. Professor and legal scholar Cynthia Lee, who co-wrote the
critical race theory textbook on criminal procedure,139 has applied this
idea to excessive force doctrine by showing that “reasonable fear” of
suspects is infused with racial stereotypes.140 As will be discussed, police excessive force might be an expected result of the excessive contacts with black and brown poor people that the centaur state has
encouraged with its war on crime.
Indeed, the Court’s doctrine seems to endorse police activity
based on explicit and implicit biases. Racial profiling is not only pervasive, but it is tacitly encouraged by the Court’s pretext doctrine,
which generally finds racially motivated stops reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment when there was also probable cause that the suspect committed any offense.141 Pretext doctrine contributes to police
officers’ senses that they can force contact with black and brown people with impunity.142 The legal doctrines governing excessive force
136 See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 560. Seth Stoughton reminds me that while police do
intentionally target racial minority neighborhoods, they understand themselves as doing so in a
race-neutral way. In theory, police data-driven patrol allocation methods use crime rates, not
racial demographics. But because police significantly affect crime rates through their selective
enforcement of laws, police crime statistics are not a race-neutral measure.
137 See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982) https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/G6ED-EB7S].
138 See Cooper, supra note 28, at 58–59 (discussing Wilson’s racism).
139 See Cynthia Lee, L. Song Richardson & Tamara Lawson, Criminal Procedure: Cases
and Materials (2d ed. 2017).
140 See Lee, supra note 19, at 645 (pointing to black-as-criminal stereotype).
141 Compare Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“But the constitutional
basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection
Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probablecause Fourth Amendment analysis.”), with Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372
(2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, as the recent debate over racial profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual.”). See also David Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other
Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 547–48 (1997) (detailing how pretext doctrine allows racial profiling).
142 The Court effectively makes racism irrelevant to the determination of whether an intrusion is “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”); see also
id. at 817 (“It is of course true that in principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns
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might thus be more of a cause of real world excessive force than the
implicit or explicit biases of police officers.143
The broad reason to believe doctrine is at least as much of a factor in excessive force as bias finds root in the theory of the “endogenous Fourth Amendment.” This theory argues that in excessive force
doctrine, “constitutional meaning is created from the ground up by
federal courts’ deference to use-of-force policies that reflect police officers’ perspectives and preferences, rather than from the ‘top down’
by judicial interpretation of the Constitution.”144 Excessive force doctrine is endogenous because courts are merely looking at actual police
department policies and finding them reasonable rather than judging
those policies against an external standard.145
The narrower reason to believe legal doctrine generates police
excessive force is that the Graham decision took certain options for
reform off the table. The Graham opinion’s disavowal of Due Process
analysis in favor of the Fourth Amendment took “structural and raceconscious” remedies off the table.146 Because the fundamental problem of excessive force doctrine is structural racial disparity, the move
to the individual-centered Fourth Amendment sapped much of the
force out of police misconduct claims.147
The Court’s doctrine is not just flawed, but it also undermines
reform efforts on the ground.148 The Court’s doctrine encourages police rule-breaking by justifying violations of state law or department
policy as nonetheless Constitutionally reasonable.149 The Court’s doctrine allows police officers to violate department policies and even
state law, which is a principal reason departments cannot discipline
officers or do not even bother attempting to do so.150
Scholarship shows that police racial bias combines with judicial
indifference to produce excessive force. Still, this research does not
rule out nonracial influences on police excessive force.151 Section II.B
makes the case for simultaneously considering class and race as facupon a ‘reasonableness’ determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.” (emphasis
added)). Implicitly, then, it makes police racism “reasonable.”
143 See Osagie K. Obasogie, More than Bias: How Law Produces Police Violence, 100 B.U.
L. REV. 771, 783 (2020).
144 See id. at 775.
145 See Obasogie & Newman, supra note 19, at 427.
146 Obasogie, supra note 143, at 779.
147 Cf. id. at 777.
148 See Hardaway, supra note 106, at 1193.
149 See id. at 1204 (criticizing doctrinal inflexibility).
150 See id. at 1213.
151 See Carbado, supra note 40, at 128.
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tors in producing police excessive force. The way to do so is to adopt
intersectionality theory.
B. Takeaways from Intersectionality Theory
Having reviewed the Court’s undercutting of doctrinal protections against police excessive force through a racial lens, it will be
helpful to consider intersectionality theory’s ability to incorporate
class analysis. In brief, when categories of identity—such as race, gender, class, sex orientation, religion, ability, and age—intersect, that
creates unique senses of self-identity and unique attributed identities.152 How we see ourselves and how we are seen both vary based on
our particular intersection of identities.153 That idea is a simple one
with complicated implications.154
Legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw is the progenitor of intersectionality theory. She introduced the concept in a 1989 article about
employment discrimination.155 She demonstrated that numerous cases
treated black women as though they could not be representative of
152 As preeminent sociologist of race, gender, and class Patricia Hill Collins says, “Individuals and groups differentially placed within intersecting systems of power have different points of
view on their own and others’ experiences . . . .” See Collins, supra note 25, at 14.
153 See McGinley & Cooper, supra note 12, at 329.
154 Indeed, there is a lively debate as to whether the related “multidimensionality theory”
adds distinctive value to intersectionality theory. I conclude that multidimensionality theory has
fleshed out some important ideas that were nascent in intersectionality theory. See, e.g., Darren
Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 291 (2001); Darren
Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory
and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1999); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet
Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 561, 566 (1997); Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Afterword, Religion, Gender,
Sexuality, Race and Class in Coalitional Theory: A Critical and Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit
Social Justice Agendas, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 503, 509 (1998). Legal scholar Athena
Mutua has provocatively declared that “early interpretations of intersectionality theory, its
groundings in the analyses of women’s lives, and the way in which women’s lives were both
understood and examined, limited intersectionality’s intuitive power in analyzing men as
gendered beings for some legal scholars.” Athena D. Mutua, Multidimensionality Is to Masculinities What Intersectionality Is to Feminism, 13 NEV. L.J. 341, 342–43 (2013). However, as Professor
Ann C. McGinley and I noted in an earlier publication, “Juliet Williams pointed out that there
are political reasons for making people aware of the intersectional roots of multidimensionality,
not least of which is to avoid displacement of the critical race feminist roots of intersectionality.
We agree that multidimensionality theory makes the most sense when it is explained in light of
its roots in intersectionality theory.” Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Identities Cubed:
Perspectives on Multidimensional Masculinities Theory, 13 NEV. L.J. 326, 335 (2013) (footnote
omitted). On the basis of the last sentence of that quote, I now disagree with my earlier self and
conclude that “intersectionality theory” as originally conceived contained all of the insights
needed to capture the issues I am trying to illuminate.
155 Crenshaw, supra note 24, at 140; see also Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
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the class of women in general or blacks in general because of racial
and gender difference but refused to recognize a category of discrimination at the intersection of race and gender.156 Intersectionality theory recognizes compound identities like black-woman, and explores
their implications for legal and social analysis.
Put simply, there are three phases of identity: self-identity, attributed identity, and identity negotiation (also known as identity performance).157 Respectively, these are how one thinks of oneself in
one’s head, how others perceive an individual, and how one behaves
in social interactions. In the last of those three aspects of identities,
individuals try to negotiate between how they see themselves and how
the world sees them by performing their identity, i.e., behaving, in
ways that may alter how they are seen.158 Professors Devon Carbado
and Mitu Gulati call this concept “working identity” because people
do work in terms of their behavior and dress in order to affect how
they are seen.159 Although this Section does not purport to be a comprehensive review of intersectionality theory, it does explore several
relevant takeaways from intersectionality theory.160
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241,
1243–44 (1991) (defining and explicating intersectionality).
156

Crenshaw, supra note 24, at 141–50.

R

See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259,
1264–65, 1268 (2000) (explicating relationship between sense of self, stereotypes, and identity
performance).
157

158

McGinley & Cooper, supra note 12, at 329.

Carbado & Gulati, supra note 12, at 701, 705–06 (2001); see generally Carbado & Gulati,
supra note 157, at 1264–65 (discussing identity performance). Law professor Kenji Yoshino refers to the similar concept of “covering,” whereby people who are known to be different from
the norm attempt to make themselves more palatable through behavior and dress. See generally
KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006) (describing
covering in relation to gay legal history).
159

160 Patricia Hill Collins identifies a number of assumptions that are prevalent in intersectionality scholarship. She says that one or more of these assumptions is always present, though
some may be absent, and the configuration varies. See Collins, supra note 25, at 14. Here is a
summary of her list:

•

“Race, class, gender, sexuality, age, ability, nation, ethnicity, and similar categories . . . are best understood in relational terms . . . .”;

•

Categories of identity create power relations—racism, sexism, classism, and related prejudices—that are interrelated;

•

The power relations influence social formations that are organized around unequal distribution of material relations and social experiences;

•

Social formations are “historically contingent and cross-culturally specific,” varying across times and places;

•

Individuals differentially positioned “within intersecting systems of power” develop “different points of view on their own and others’ experiences”;
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First, specific categories of identity, such as race, gender, class,
and so on, are not just relationally constructed, but also mutually constructed. To say that race is relationally constructed is simply to say
that whiteness gains meaning from its opposition to blackness.161 Going further, sociologist of race, gender, and class Patricia Hill Collins’s
four fundamental premises of intersectionality include recognition
that race, gender, class, and related categories of identities “mutually
construct” one another.162 That is, discourses that are primarily about
the social meaning of one identity are nonetheless affected by discourses about other identities.
The black-male-as-criminal discourse that undergirds white
supremacy reveals both the specificity of the identity at the intersection of blackness and maleness and also how race and gender are mutually constructed. The “Black + Male = Criminal” stereotype shares
some ideas with assumptions about black female sexuality, such as the
notion that blacks are aggressive,163 but is distinct from those assumptions in its presumption of a willingness to commit physical violence.
Moreover, the intersectional identity black-male is co-constituted with
other intersectional identities. Part of the meaning of race in the Jim
Crow era—black men as incipient rapists—was constructed in relation
to other intersectional identities—white-females as in need of whitemales’ protection.164 In that ongoing stereotype, the meaning of race is
that black maleness is linked to rapacious desire and white femaleness
is innocent and idealized. Meanwhile, black women were not given
access to that Victorian femininity. During black chattel bondage,
white men purported to protect white women by locking them into the
private sphere while also allowing themselves to rape black women.165
•

Social formations of inequality “are fundamentally unjust,” thus sparking “engagements that uphold or contest the status quo.”
Id. For further thinking on how to conceptualize intersectionality theory, see Collins’s six themes
in the topics of intersectional analyses. See id. at 11–13.
161 See generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES (3d ed. 2015) (discussing relational nature of race).
162 COLLINS, supra note 24, at 48.
163 See COLLINS, supra note 26, at 89 (noting that even “black lady” stereotype assumes
black women are too assertive).
164 See Chang et al., supra note 41, at 23 (discussing how race and gender mutually construct one another).
165 See, e.g., Andrea J. Ritchie, #sayhername: Racial Profiling and Police Violence Against
Black Women, 41 HARBINGER 187, 191 (2016) (referring to “a systemic arc of police brutality
and state-sanctioned violence against Indigenous, Black and Brown women and gender nonconforming people, beginning with the first colonizing armies and the advent of slave patrols, and
continuing through the systematic rape, denial of reproductive autonomy, and theft of children
of Indigenous and African descended women”).
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Hence, the racial meaning of black-male-as-criminal has been constructed through the simultaneous construction of the meaning of gender.166 A central assumption about race, the idea that black men have
a proclivity to assault white women, turns on a central assumption
about gender, that white women’s innocence requires them to be sheltered away from black men.167 That formulation simultaneously constructs black men as in need of surveillance,168 white women as on a
pedestal and in a cage,169 and white men as off the hook for their violence against black women.170 The racial hierarchy has implied a gender hierarchy, and vice versa. In that sense, race and gender are
mutually constructed. As Section II.C and Part III of this Article
demonstrate, people’s class statuses also intersect with and mutually
construct other identities, such as race and gender.171
Second, another takeaway from intersectionality theory is that
categories of identity—race, gender, class, and so on—correspond
with systems of social power—racism, sexism, classism, and so on. It is
because there is racial categorization that there can be racism. This is
Id.
The Jim Crow lynching machinery also created a quandary for white women: “If they
didn’t lie about being raped by a black man, they were labeled whores and liars; if they cried
rape and played their role in the system of domination over black men, they were in fact liars.”
Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 22 (1998).
168 See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1272
(2017) (noting that surveillance cameras are currently concentrated in black and brown
communities).
169 See Chang et al., supra note 41, at 25 (describing white women as “on a pedestal, but
also in a cage”).
170 See Ritchie, supra note 165, at 191 (linking white men’s rapes during black chattel bondage to present day police rapes).
171 Consider, for example, the mutual construction of class and whiteness in politics. See,
e.g., Pruitt, supra note 12, at 585–86 (criticizing “the Left” for blaming white women for Hillary
Clinton’s 2016 presidential election loss); Maureen Johnson, Separate but (Un)equal: Why Institutionalized Anti-Racism Is the Answer to the Never-Ending Cycle of Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 U.
RICH. L. REV. 327, 365 (2018) (discussing resurgence of white supremacy through class politics);
Joshua S. Sellers, Election Law and White Identity Politics, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1515, 1530–31
(2019) (explaining white voters’ turn from President Barack Obama to President Donald
Trump); Gregory S. Parks & Derek S. Hicks, “How Much a Dollar Cost?” Political Ideology,
Religion, and Poverty Policy Through the Lens of Kendrick Lamar’s Music, 28 S. CAL. REV. L. &
SOC. JUST. 197, 246 (2019) (contending that working-class whites became more fatalistic about
class mobility during the Trump campaign); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, WHITE WORKING CLASS 74
(2017) (dissecting why working-class whites supported Trump); Kaaryn Gustafson, The
Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 653 (2009) (discussing
then–California Governor Ronald Reagan’s “welfare queen” myth); Lisa R. Pruitt, Welfare
Queens and White Trash, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 289, 290–91 (2016) (arguing “welfare
queen” phenomenon hurts both whites and blacks).
166
167
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not to say that race is merely a social construct that does not exist.
Rather, race is socially constructed but materially consequential.172 We
must attend to categories of identities because they have taken root in
systems of social power.
Third, systems of social power themselves intersect, creating the
set of interlocking hierarchies that influences how individuals are
treated. The systems of social power—racism, sexism, classism, and so
on—that correspond with identities interlock because they are part of
an overall system of oppressions.173 For instance, during the Enlightenment, Western thinkers were obsessed with classifying and hierarchizing everything, including bodily characteristics.174 They created
the “scaling of bodies,”175 which classified people—male over female,
white over black, Christian over others, and so on—such that individuals could be ranked along various axes.176 Systems of social power
take many forms, such as racism, sexism, classism, and so on, but what
makes oppression a system is the shared principle of those somewhat
distinct systems of classification: that there must be rankings of people. The resulting system could be referred to as “the interlocking
hierarchies.”177
One simple way to understand how the interlocking hierarchies
create identities is to analogize a person’s particular intersectional social location—where they are in the map of categories of identity and
systems of social power—to the Myers-Briggs personality types. The
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator test asks people to consider which side of
172 See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, Our First Unisex President?: Black Masculinity and
Obama’s Feminine Side, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 633, 643 (2009).
173

See COLLINS, supra note 26, at 137–38 (discussing matrix of domination).

174

IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE

175

Id. at 128.

AND THE

POLITICS

OF

R

DIFFERENCE 123–24, 130 (2011).

See id. at 123–24. That is not to say that all oppressions operate in the same manner.
Patricia Hill Collins used to refer to a similar concept as the “matrix of domination,” but
she no longer does so. Compare COLLINS, supra note 26, passim (using term), with COLLINS,
supra note 24, at 10, 239 (eschewing term, using it only once, and stating, “I analyze power
relations not by emphasizing domination, but rather by developing the concept of intellectual
resistance and exploring intersectionality’s connections to it”). Collins’s point in describing a
“matrix of domination” was to model supposedly distinct systems of social power as intersecting.
See COLLINS, supra note 26, at 221–38 (comparing older model of race, class, and gender to
intersectionality). But see Jennifer C. Nash, ‘Home Truths’ on Intersectionality, 23 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 445, 462 (2011) (criticizing Collins’s “matrix of domination” framework as implying a
stable set of hierarchies). I see the matrix of domination as a tool for describing how hierarchies
are working in a particular cultural context at a particular moment, not as a rigid metaphor.
Recognizing the difficulty, though, I refer to what Collins might have called “the matrix of domination” as “the interlocking hierarchies.” This term provides more of a sense that hierarchies are
overlapping and constantly shifting.
176
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the continuum they fall on within four categories: being an Extrovert
(“E”) versus an Introvert (“I”), a Senser (“S”) of the world rather
than someone who relies on Intuition (“N”), a Thinker (“T”) versus a
Feeler (“F”), and a Judger (“J”) rather than a Perceiver (“P”).178 It
then identifies people based on their positions within the categories.
Hence, someone who is an Extrovert, relies on Intuition, is a Thinker,
and is a Perceiver, would be identified as an “E-N-T-P” type of person.179 The Myers-Briggs test assumes that knowing that specific combination of characteristics will tell us something important about an
individual’s personality.180 This Article contends that knowing the specific combination of major identities of a person also tells us something important about them.181
The point here is that people’s social locations significantly influence how they are likely to see themselves, to be seen, and to need to
perform their identities to fit into particular contexts. In the category
of race, whites are generally ranked over Asians, Latinx, blacks, Native peoples, and other non-whites. In the category of gender, men are
ranked over women and other gender identities. In the category of
class, the rich are ranked over the poor, but United States society contains myriad gradations of economic status. Each of those identity hierarchies also intersects with the other identity hierarchies.
Now imagine that, at least at a given time and in a given social
context, everybody has specific identities within the various categories. So, one might be black, female, professional-class, straight, dis/
abled, and middle-aged. We could say that a person’s specific combination of identities is likely to influence how they see themself, how
they are seen, and the types of identity performance work they would
need to do to fit into particular contexts. As Kimberlé Crenshaw
demonstrated, the intersection of black and female has some overlap
with black men and white women, but is a unique social position. We
are all intersectional in this sense, as even those in the privileged posi178 See MBTI Basics, MYERS & BRIGGS FOUND., https://www.myersbriggs.org/my-mbti-personality-type/mbti-basics/ [https://perma.cc/B9TY-VJTW] (defining the Myers-Briggs approach).
179 See id. (identifying sixteen personality types).
180 See id.
181 For instance, scholars have demonstrated that a person’s status as a “white-male-professional-homosexual” may cause him to prioritize his privileged identities over his subordinated
one(s) by joining conservative groups. See generally Mary F. Rogers & Phillip B. Lott, Backlash,
the Matrix of Domination, and Log Cabin Republicans, 38 SOCIO. Q. 497 (1997) (explaining why
Republicans’ anti-gay stance did not dissuade gay men). For a discourse analysis of the intersection of sexuality, gender, and race in another context, see Russell K. Robinson, Racing the
Closet, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1463 (2009) (analyzing media coverage of black men loving men on
“the DL”).
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tion in many categories, such as white men of the upper-classes who
are heterosexual, Christian, able-bodied, and young adults, will have
their senses of self and attributed identities shaped by that social location.182 However, the low ranking of both blackness and womanhood
in the scaling of bodies makes people at the social location “blackwoman” confront different challenges than individuals at other locations. Ultimately, we need to reject the scaling of bodies, but for now
we must acknowledge that the scaling of bodies creates specific social
locations for people that influence how they see themselves and how
they are treated, at least at a given time and in a given social context.
Four insights emerge from the analogy between social locations
and the Myers-Briggs personality types. First, as with personality, people’s own and others’ senses of their identities can change over time.
Second, likewise, senses of self, attributed identities, and the possibilities for identity performance change in different social contexts. For
example, a black-male-heterosexual might see himself and be seen in
one way in a mostly white environment, another way in a mostly black
environment, and in other ways at a barbeque in the ‘hood, at the
opera, and in a classroom. That is, different aspects of one’s identities
may be more or less salient in different contexts. Third, the seemingly
distinct identities that intersect with one another to create social locations are themselves co-constituted. As was noted, the meaning of
race has been influenced by, and has influenced, the meaning of gender.183 Lastly, and most important for our current purposes, social
structures—such as the state’s criminalization system—interact with
identities to influence the outcomes of social interactions. In the
United States, police tend to selectively enforce the laws in specific
ways because of how our particular social structure interacts with people’s social locations. It is the social location of poor black and brown
people that creates the phenomenon of racial profiling.184
A fourth takeaway from intersectionality theory is that the interlocking hierarchies themselves interact with social institutions to exac182 See generally Rogers & Lott, supra note 181, at 497 (explaining Log Cabin
Republicans).
183 See Chang et al., supra note 41, at 21 (using Alabama case, McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d
388 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953), concerning a purported attempted rape, as an example of mutual
construction of race and gender).
184 Again, the same identity may be privileged in some contexts and subordinated in others.
For example, the NYPD targeted young black and brown men for programmatic stop and frisk.
See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). It was marginally
better to be a woman for those purposes even though men are generally accorded more privilege
than women. This is not to say that black and brown women do not suffer from police targeting
and violence—they do.
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erbate or reduce oppression. The figure below presents a simple
model of how social structures meet identities:185
THE INTERSECTIONAL APPROACH MODEL
SOCIAL CHANGE

FOR

POLICY &

Briefly, this illustration helps us understand “[t]he interplay between structures and identities” in ways that allow us to illuminate
why certain people are policed in particular ways.186 Of note is the way
that the wheel shows the identities at the core of the figure as being
influenced by structural factors. However, because the identities also
cluster into particular intersectional configurations, not unlike MyersBriggs personality types, the social context will have different effects
C. NICOLE MASON, WOMEN OF COLOR POL’Y NETWORK, LEADING AT THE INTERSEC6 (Colleen Coffey ed., 2010).
186 Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1449 (2012) (contending intersectional perspective helps better understand social control of women of color).
185
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on different people. The figure thus fails to illustrate a necessary understanding that the identities at its core intersect with, and mutually
construct, one another. Nonetheless, the interaction of the social
structure with those intersecting and mutually constructed identities
can exacerbate or ameliorate issues created by a person’s social
location.
Based on this fourth takeaway about intersectionality, we must
recognize that all social encounters take place within a complex world
of hierarchy. What seems like a simple interaction between two people is overdetermined by both the ways the meanings of particular
identities have already been formed for us and the interplay of those
identities with social structures that are well beyond our individual
control. Most people have a complicated position in the interlocking
hierarchies; they are both subordinated along some axes and privileged along others.187 Being socially located at different places in the
interlocking hierarchies and confronting different social institutions
leads to different results. Part III of this Article helps demonstrate the
interlocking nature of identity hierarchies by showing that both race
and class play significant roles in why a specific social institution, the
police, selectively enforces the law differently in different
neighborhoods.
Another implication of the fourth takeaway is that intersectionality theory helps reveal that social institutions themselves can intersect
in ways that exacerbate subordination. Law professor and scholar of
race and gender Dorothy Roberts emphasizes this point by concentrating on the way social systems are intersectional.188 She says, “The
analysis of the roles black mothers play in both the prison and foster
care systems reveals that these systems intersect with each other
jointly to perpetuate unjust hierarchies of race, class, and gender.”189
Kimberlé Crenshaw accentuates systems intersectionality by connecting it to the interlocking hierarchies of identities. For her, social institutions “situate women of color within contexts structured by various
187 For instance, men are generally privileged, but also usually subordinated in some way.
See Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Post-Racialism and the Gates Controversy: The False
Equivalence Between Officer and Civilian, 11 NEV. L.J. 1, 22 (2010) (“Penalty status is the condition of already having something about your identity that makes your masculinity suspect. For
example, if the idealized masculinity is heterosexual, white, and upper-middle-class (and, arguably, Christian), then men who do not fit all of those categories know their quest to measure up to
the ideal is already hampered.” (footnote omitted)).
188 Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black
Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1491 (2012).
189

Id.
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social hierarchies and that render them disproportionally available to
certain punitive policies and discretionary judgments that dynamically
reproduce these hierarchies.”190 Consequently, the “co-constitutedness” of intersectional identities and intersectional social systems can
make people all the more vulnerable to oppression.
For instance, legal scholar and community activist Priscilla Ocen
tells the tale of the partnership between the Antioch, California police
department and local residents of predominantly white neighborhoods.191 Civilians were encouraged to report potential housing code
violations by poor people using housing vouchers to obtain entry into
these neighborhoods.192 The targeted people were, unsurprisingly,
overwhelmingly black and female.193 That example reminds us to remain aware that the institution of policing itself can overlap with other
social systems to exacerbate subordination.
A final implication of the fourth takeaway from intersectionality
theory is that it can be a method for analyzing how identities, culture,
and law combine to produce specific results. Patricia Hill Collins has
cited cultural studies pioneer Stuart Hall for the proposition that intersectionality can be used both to conduct a genealogy of how a certain worldview became a hegemonic discourse at a particular moment,
as well as how other discourses do, or might, struggle against that
view.194 I make a similar argument in my article, A Genealogy of
Programmatic Stop and Frisk: The Discourse-to-Practice-Circuit.195
Therein, I contend that macro-level cultural discourses like calls for
“law and order”196 lead to meso-level ideological narratives like
“backlash criminology”197 and conservative judicial doctrines, which,
in turn, produce day-to-day micro-level police practices like programmatic stop and frisk.198 As I say there:
The basic question is how does a big picture idea that has
gained society-wide traction influence what the police do on
the street? The answer is that big picture discourses fight for
See Crenshaw, supra note 186, at 1427 (explicating systems intersectionality).
Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540, 1544–45 (2012).
192 Id.
193 See id.
194 Collins, supra note 25, at 15.
195 Cooper, supra note 28, at 1.
196 Id. at 47 (“Law enforcement justifies this ‘New Jim Crow’ through calls for law and
order.”); see also id. at 47–53 (detailing growth of this discourse and its effects).
197 Id. at 58–63 (linking criminological theories to racial profiling through programmatic
stop and frisk).
198 See id. at 39 (providing illustration of these relationships).
190
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hegemony on the macro level of society and, if they achieve
it, promulgate discipline-specific discourses at the meso level
that may then be translated into specific micro-level
practices.199
Part III of this Article thus uses intersectionality as a method for understanding the disproportionate application of warrior policing in
poor black and brown neighborhoods.
Together, these takeaways paint a picture of people as complex
and of the institution of policing as necessarily affected by that complexity. Although race is obviously important to policing, intersectionality theory encourages consideration of the ways other factors, such
as the class structure, work with race to produce outcomes. Section
II.C hones in on the effects of the United States’ current economic
structure.
C. Class Analysis
We have seen that race does not operate by itself, so now we need
to see how it intersects with the class structure. To make the impact of
the class structure concrete, consider the income levels in Summerlin
and the Westside. In Summerlin, the median annual household income is $91,200.200 On the Westside, the median annual household income is about $32,500.201 The median annual household income in Las
Vegas as a whole is $52,600.202 The stark economic disparities between
Summerlin and the Westside provide reason to believe that disparate
policing in those communities is about class as well as race. To better
understand policing, we need to better understand class.
Although this Article will not provide a comprehensive review of
the application of all class theories to law, it is important to note the
way our current neoliberal economy organizes social relations.203 Neoliberalism leads to a centaur state that is soft on the top of society
through deregulation of markets and stressing individual responsibility, but hard on the bottom of society through a punitive approach to

200

Id. at 35.
Household Income in Summerlin North, Las Vegas, Nevada (Neighborhood), supra note

201

Race and Ethnicity in West Las Vegas, Las Vegas, Nevada (Neighborhood), supra note

199

15.

R

15.
Household Income in Las Vegas, Nevada (City), supra note 15.
203 ClassCrit scholars have led the discussion of class in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Harris,
supra note 12, at 39–40; Kessler, supra note 12, at 915; Pruitt, supra note 12, at 541; Athena D.
Mutua, Introducing ClassCrits: From Class Blindness to a Critical Legal Analysis of Economic
Inequality, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 859, 880 (2008).
202
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those who need welfare or get designated as criminals.204 The incentives created by the centaur state thus influence the structure of
policing.
Sociologist of poverty and crime, Loı̈c Wacquant, identifies these
four features of neoliberalism: (1) economic deregulation; (2) an emphasis on a culture of individual responsibility; (3) welfare cutbacks;
and (4) expansion of punitive apparatuses.205 First, neoliberalism’s emphasis on free markets harkens back to the laissez faire capitalism of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. That first Gilded
Age foundered when it created the Great Depression, and labor’s demands for a welfare state were finally realized.206 Nonetheless, beginning in the 1960s, calls for neoliberalism and a new Lochnerism arose
as a response to perceived excessive regulation by the growing welfare
state.207 Today, neoliberalism promotes the canard that deregulated
markets are naturally efficient and makes the maximization of shareholder profit a corporation’s prime directive.208 The “public interest”
is identified with, or subordinated to, maximizing market freedom.209
Free market deregulatory agendas like those championed by President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
are a hallmark of neoliberalism.210 In the United States, deregulation
was not halted by President Bill Clinton’s eight years in office, which
essentially accepted conservative economic principles.211 By 2000, the
neoliberal economy was basically a built-in feature of the United
States’ economic and social policies.212
See WACQUANT, supra note 33, at 43 (defining centaur state).
Squires & Lea, supra note 32, at 6.
206 This is, of course, a simplification. See Nelson Tebbe, A Democratic Political Economy
for the First Amendment, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 993 (2020).
207 For a consideration of the Court’s Lochner Era and “New Lochnerism,” see Areto A.
Imoukhuede, Gun Rights and the New Lochnerism, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 329, 330 (2017)
(arguing the recent creation of gun rights applies “the same libertarian bias that has undermined
constitutional law’s fundamental rights doctrine”).
208 See Kevin Stenson, The State, Sovereignty, and Advanced Marginality in the City, in
CRIMINALISATION AND ADVANCED MARGINALITY 41, 50 (Peter Squires & John Lea eds., 2012).
209 Id.
210 See Kenneth R. Hoover, The Rise of Conservative Capitalism: Ideological Tensions
Within the Reagan and Thatcher Governments, 29 COMPAR. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 245, 245
(1987).
211 See Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 37 (1999) (declaring that “the new regime that
Reagan introduced was consolidated during subsequent administrations,” including Clinton’s);
John W. Burns & Andrew J. Taylor, A New Democrat? The Economic Performance of the Clinton Presidency, 5 INDEP. REV. 387, 387–89 (2001).
212 See generally DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 5–39 (2005).
204
205
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Next in Wacquant’s identification comes the symbolic and ideological dimension of neoliberalism. Feminist legal scholar of criminalization Aya Gruber calls out neoliberalism “as ‘a political project to
re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the
power of economic elites’ by reconceptualizing individualism and capitalism as moral imperatives and denigrating distributive justice as encouraging moral failure.”213 The combined effect of Clinton-era
workfare and crime bills was to define “the idea of the poor as a problem self-generated by pathological culture.”214 This is neoliberalism
seeking to persuade the middle- and upper-classes that punitive management of the precariat is necessary through the “penal pornography” of depictions of the poor as inherently criminal.215 It also tries to
persuade the poor themselves to accept their lot in life as their own
fault.216 All of this is part of neoliberalism’s promotion of an individualistic culture where greed is good and the poor deserve their fate.
Third, although neoliberalism purports to shrink the state
through deregulation and minimizing social welfare, it is actually producing a new state with different characteristics than the 1960s welfare
state. The neoliberal state is “fundamentally hostile to the social welfare system and has taken an active role in attacks on its intellectual
and political credibility.”217 As a result, there have been selective reductions in state spending.218 The reductions focus on its provision of
social services but generally exclude the military, punitive apparatuses, and corporate welfare. The retraction and recomposition of social welfare that had been initiated by President Reagan actually
accelerated during the Clinton years, as President Clinton turned welfare into “workfare.”219 Workfare says that people should be forced to
213 Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical Criminal
Law Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3211, 3216 (2015) (quoting HARVEY, supra note 212, at
19).

R

214 See Squires & Lea, supra note 32, at 12 (discussing Lynn Hancock & Gerry Mooney,
Beyond the Penal State: Advanced Marginality, Social Policy, and Anti-welfarism, in CRIMINALISATION AND ADVANCED MARGINALITY 107, 173 (Peter Squires & John Lea eds., 2012)).

R

215 Id. at 2; see also Wacquant, supra note 27, at 250 (listing depictions of criminals as unredeemable and worthy of hatred).

R

216

Squires & Lea, supra note 32, at 2.

217

White, supra note 21, at 820.

R

218

Squires & Lea, supra note 32, at 1.

R

219 See Bill Clinton, Opinion, How We Ended Welfare, Together, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22,
2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/22/opinion/22clinton.html [https://perma.cc/4G5PDWBQ]; see also KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE 43–52 (2011) (contending that
cutting welfare is part of neoliberal economic movement).
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work low-wage, insecure jobs, with distributive justice existing only as
a last resort.220
Finally, punitiveness is built into the neoliberal state. Neoliberalism is “not the retreat of the state but the development of new techniques of coercion and social control.”221 Chief among these new
techniques is a hyper-incarceration strategy that essentially “warehouses” those whom neoliberalism fails to employ.222 President Clinton also takes deserved blame for maintaining the Reagan Drug War
and doubling down on hyper-incarceration through his draconian
crime bills.223
Ultimately, the United States’ neoliberal centaur state “weds the
‘invisible hand’ of the market to the ‘iron fist’ of the penal state.”224
Moreover, it is precisely because the centaur state both weakens the
position of the underemployed and compromises their social safety
net that it must encourage a punitive state. The reasons for this can be
characterized as follows:
[T]he neoliberal state leaves economic growth to the working of the market but intervenes strongly to make labour attractive to mobile global capital and create[s] cities and
regions as ‘business-friendly’ environments. . . . [Risks to civilians’ health, safety, and general welfare are treated] as
matters of personal responsibility and insurance while concentrating on security from another set of risks presented by
the poor and the structurally unemployed to the middle classes and securely employed working class.225
The neoliberal state is most concerned with appealing to global capital. But the flipside of the free reign of capital—a fundamental part of
neoliberalism—is the need for the state to manage the populations
that become marginalized, which occurs largely because of neoliberalSee GUSTAFSON, supra note 219, at 43–52.
Squires & Lea, supra note 32, at 1.
222 See id. at 6–7 (commenting on Stanley Cohen, Ideology? What Ideology?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 387 (2010)); see also id. at 12–13 (considering Vincenzo Ruggiero, Illicit
Economies and the Carceral Social Zone, in CRIMINALISATION AND ADVANCED MARGINALITY
173 (Peter Squires & John Lea eds., 2012)).
223 See Wacquant, supra note 27, 245–46; see also Udi Ofer, How the 1994 Crime Bill Fed
the Mass Incarceration Crisis, ACLU (June 4, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smartjustice/mass-incarceration/how-1994-crime-bill-fed-mass-incarceration-crisis [https://perma.cc/
9VUR-XT6X]; A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG POL’Y ALL., https://drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-history-drug-war [https://perma.cc/6S4G-YYUY].
224 Wacquant, supra note 27, at 247.
225 John Lea & Simon Hallsworth, Bringing the State Back in: Understanding Neoliberal
Security, in CRIMINALISATION AND ADVANCED MARGINALITY 19, 21 (Peter Squires & John Lea
eds., 2012).
220
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ism’s economic agenda. This marginalized population is called “the
precariat” because their state of advanced marginality makes their
lives insecure or precarious.226
The neoliberal state has a core assumption that the precariat will
be supervised and controlled through workfare and prison.227 This
management of the precariat is a result of the social agenda that
comes along with the neoliberal economic agenda: the rolling back of
the state’s former social welfare agenda and undermining of those institutions. Formerly, the Keynesian political-economic agenda sought
full employment, social cohesion, and social mobility through providing education and a social safety net.228 But now the neoliberal state’s
political-economic agenda of mobility of capital at the global level
promotes pushing down labor costs, which dismantles the prior cooperation between labor and capital and makes most forms of employment insecure.229
A significant reason that neoliberalism has come to focus on the
precariat is racial. The neoliberal state no longer believes in the
Keynesian ideal of social cohesion. Consequently, “the move to the
market state has generated the notion that minorities need not be assimilated.”230 Simultaneously, racism ratchets up neoliberalism’s mistreatment of the poor.231 The poor, who are disproportionately racial
minorities and figuratively blackened, become both unnecessary to assimilate and undesirable to assimilate. They become unnecessary to
assimilate because the neoliberal economy tolerates higher unemployment, and undesirable to assimilate because of long-standing and unresolved racism. This is another way that race and class mutually
construct one another.
The fact that the precariat are blackened in the popular mind
makes it easier to pursue certain policing strategies. The “new policing,” sometimes known as preventive policing, proactive policing, or
aggressive patrol,232 is built upon the foundation of James Q. Wilson’s
226 See GUY STANDING, GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE, THE PRECARIAT: TODAY’S
TRANSFORMATIVE CLASS? 6–7, https://greattransition.org/images/Standing-The-Precariat.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QKD4-XEJ2].
227 See Squires & Lea, supra note 32, at 1, 2.
228 See Lea & Hallsworth, supra note 225, at 19.
229 See id. at 20–21.
230 George A. Martı́nez, Bobbitt, the Rise of the Market State, and Race, 18 J. GENDER, SOC.
POL’Y & L. 587, 594 (2010).
231 See White, supra note 21, at 819 (“Race aggravates both marginality and its effects,
thereby enhancing the sense of threat and the felt need to reject the welfare state for ever more
coercive and punitive forms of control.”).
232 See generally Heymann, supra note 30, 422–40 (defining and discussing “new policing”);
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broken windows theory and zero tolerance methods.233 The prime elements of this method are the pervasive stopping and frisking of young
brown and black men in certain neighborhoods for weapons and the
use of pretextual de minimis offenses to target the same cohort for
searches for drugs.234 Wilson himself was dubious; a believer in racelinked criminality.235 His theory was worse, as it assumed aggressive
policing would primarily be visited upon black and brown people and
did not care.236 “It would be more accurate to describe forms of police
activity carried out on behalf of ‘zero tolerance’ as strategies of selective intolerance,” says one commentator.237
If intolerance lies at the heart of the “new policing,” that is because such policing is connected to neoliberalism’s centaur state. We
see this in the fact that neoliberalism positions the police as those who
help separate the unwilling from the marginal workers, thereby beginning the process of warehousing the resisters in prison. Welfare “reforms” push people into low-wage, insecure jobs. Simultaneously, the
“new policing” warehouses those unable or unwilling to conform to
the neoliberal social order by means of hyper-incarceration. Selective
enforcement of criminalization laws thus manifests the broader selective intolerance of the neoliberal state. This leads to the conclusion
that police excessive force, and the Court’s tacit endorsement thereof,
fits with neoliberalism’s punitive approach to the poor. In sum, our
neoliberal class structure is significantly incentivizing the harsh policing that has mostly been analyzed as a primarily racial phenomenon.
III. THE “NEW POLICING”

AS

BOUNDARY MANAGEMENT

Part II of this Article reviewed scholarship on excessive force and
proposed that scholars use an intersectional approach to policing that
emphasizes the mutual construction of race and class. To demonstrate
the utility of this approach, Part III will connect the Court’s grant of
discretion to use excessive force with police choices to use excessive
force against poor black and brown communities. Ultimately, it argues
that class-race incentives lead deregulated warrior cops to maintain
see also MALCOLM GLADWELL, TALKING TO STRANGERS 324, 341 (2019) (using terminology
“proactively policing” and “aggressive policing”).
233 See generally Kelling & Wilson, supra note 137.
234 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (detailing
NYPD focus on young black and brown males).
235 See Cooper, supra note 28, at 59.
236 See id. at 10, 58–61.
237 Valeria Vegh Weis, Criminal Selectivity in the United States: A History Plagued by Class
& Race Bias, 10 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 1, 22 n.111 (2017).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-6\GWN603.txt

unknown

Seq: 40

9-DEC-21

12:30

2021] INTERSECTIONALITY, POLICE EXCESSIVE FORCE, AND CLASS 1491

boundaries between rich white neighborhoods and poor black and
brown ones by means of the threat of excessive force.
Section III.A explains how the neoliberal economic agenda leads
to a politics of law and order that draws the Court into a role of “loyal
foot soldier[s]” in wars on crime.238 Section III.B shows that there is a
warrior mindset amongst police that is largely applied to poor black
and brown neighborhoods by means of the preventive, proactive, and
predictive methods of the “new policing.” In other words, the police
are increasingly adopting the warrior model over the guardian approach. That Section shows how both class and race influence the
move to warrior policing. Section III.C critiques the “new policing” as
a means of boundary management that splits rich white neighborhoods from poor black and brown ones.
A. The Court’s Deregulation of the Police
The Court’s excessive force doctrine can be understood as a
movement from a Court that sought to regulate police behavior to one
that sought to deregulate the police. There has long been a sense that
criminal procedure developed out of the Court’s concerns about rampant police abuses, especially those against blacks.239 For instance, in
Brown v Mississippi,240 the Court expressed disapproval for admittedly abusive police tactics against blacks.241 The Court also expressed
its general displeasure about the use of “third degree” tactics: beatings
to produce confessions.242 And these cases began to take on a role as
civil rights advancements for blacks subjected to harsh police tactics.
They were a way to regulate police excessive force, which was concentrated on blacks from its inception.243
238 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Erik
Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 755, 756 (2002).
239 See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1157 (1998) (“Although rarely acknowledged by the Court, the racial
dimension of these cases was not lost on contemporary observers.”).
240 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
241 Id. at 284–85 (1936) (“It is interesting to note that in his testimony with reference to the
whipping of the defendant Ellington, and in response to the inquiry as to how severely he was
whipped, the deputy stated, ‘Not too much for a negro; not as much as I would have done if it
were left to me.’ . . . The facts are not only undisputed, they are admitted, and admitted to havebeen done by officers of the state, in conjunction with other participants, and all this was definitely well known to everybody connected with the trial, and during the trial, including the
state’s prosecuting attorney and the trial judge presiding.”).
242 See id.; see also RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 46
(2008) (discussing “third degree” abusive interrogation tactics).
243 See Sekhon, supra note 21, at 1722 (“The dominant view among scholars of why crimi-
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It certainly looks like the Court has now deregulated the police.
The question is, why? The first potential factor is race, especially as
seen in the racialization of the wars on drugs.244 Presidents Nixon and
Reagan each merged their wars on drugs with narratives about black
deviance. For Nixon, this meant making law and order an issue in such
a way as to associate blacks with crime.245 As Nixon aide John Erlichman said, “We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either
against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the
hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing
both heavily, we could disrupt those communities.”246 For the Reagan
Administration, the war on drugs was explicitly understood to be
likely to focus on blacks.247 It also aimed its rhetoric and actions at
blacks.248
The wars on drugs dramatically ramped up the use of the
criminalization system to make the United States the world’s foremost
jailer of its own people—by far.249 The ongoing war on drugs is especially responsible for hyper-incarceration. The Court played such a
significant role in that ramp up that former Justice John Paul Stevens
accused his colleagues of becoming “loyal foot soldier[s]” in the war
on drugs.250 We should thus understand the Court’s deregulation of
nal procedure has failed to restrain the police is that an increasingly conservative Supreme Court
put the brakes on the Warren Court’s ‘revolution in criminal procedure.’ ”).
244 The United States’ history of race-based drug wars goes back to at least 1850. See generally Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227 (2015) (providing history and
critique of U.S. drug wars).
245 See Erik Sherman, Nixon’s Drug War, an Excuse to Lock Up Blacks and Protestors,
Continues, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2016/03/
23/nixons-drug-war-an-excuse-to-lock-up-blacks-and-protesters-continues/#48b312342c88
[https://perma.cc/7T9G-2XE8].
246 Id.
247 See Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the
“War on Drugs” Was A “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 381, 390–91 (2002) (declaring racial disparities in Drug War policing “are the consequences of deliberate decisions;
first, to fight a ‘war’ on drugs, and second, to fight that war against low-level street dealers in
communities populated by people of color”).
248 Id. at 390–91 (“Reagan’s anti-drug rhetoric was skillfully designed to tap into deeply
held cultural attitudes about people of color and their links to drug use and other illicit
behavior.”).
249 See Countries with the Most Prisoners 2021, STATISTA (July 30, 2021) https://
www.statista.com/statistics/262961/countries-with-the-most-prisoners/ [https://perma.cc/L6QS7KPX] (charting U.S. dominance in incarceration); see also Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner,
Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020) https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/YAK4-695S] (criticizing U.S. approach to incarceration).
250 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Luna,
supra note 238, at 755 (declaring “the judiciary has become ‘a loyal foot soldier ’ in the war on

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-6\GWN603.txt

unknown

Seq: 42

9-DEC-21

12:30

2021] INTERSECTIONALITY, POLICE EXCESSIVE FORCE, AND CLASS 1493

the police as stemming from the wars on drugs, which, as was suggested in Section II.C, emanated from neoliberalism’s imperative to
lock up large numbers of people.251 “One of the key consequences of
the War on Drugs,” scholars have noted, “is that courts have relaxed
their oversight of the police.”252 This Article connects that deregulatory impulse to not just race but also class incentives created by neoliberalism’s restructuring of society.
The second potential factor in the deregulation of the police is
our changed political-economic climate. The West in general, and the
United States in particular, are caught up in a neoliberal economic
approach that reimagines the relationship between the government
and civilians. Neoliberalism’s deregulatory ideal harkens back to the
first Gilded Age, when the Court enforced the economic ideology of
“hands off” the markets.253 But the more recent neoliberal movement
took off in the 1960s.254 The story of neoliberalism includes the rise of
a group of intellectuals who championed then-radical ideas of an unregulated free market.255 A central part of that movement was a set of
University of Chicago scholars of economics and law, including eventual influential Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.256 They sought
to roll back the achievements of the welfare state and the 1960s
revolution in criminal procedure.257 As the Warren Court was propounding controversial decisions such as Miranda,258 the law-and-order narrative was being developed.259 The idea of taking a “hands off”
the police approach developed rather simultaneously with the nedrugs” (quoting Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 601)); id. at 756 nn.14–15 (citing various Justices acknowledging Court’s acquiescence to Drug War).
251 See supra Section II.C (linking neoliberalism to hyper-incarceration).
252 Nunn, supra note 247, at 402.
253 See Nelson Tebbe, A Democratic Political Economy for the First Amendment, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 993 (2020) (discussing “a tendency to naturalize private market
distributions”).
254 See Wacquant, supra note 27, at 237–38, 245.
255 See Stenson, supra note 208, at 41, 49–50.
256 Michael Avery & Danielle McLaughlin, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY: HOW CONSERVATIVES TOOK THE LAW BACK FROM LIBERALS 21 (2013); see also Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, NO MERCY: HOW CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED
AMERICA’S SOCIAL AGENDA (1996) (describing rise of conservative legal ideology).
257 See Stenson, supra note 208, at 49 (referencing the University of Chicago’s influence).
258 See generally Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 621–22 (1996).
259 See Allen Rostron, The Law and Order Theme in Political and Popular Culture, 37
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 323, 323 (2012) (“ ‘Law and order’ became a potent theme in American
politics in the 1960s. . . . Calling for law and order became a shorthand way of expressing contempt for everything that was wrong with the modern permissive society and calling for a return
to the discipline and values of the past. The law and order rallying cry also signified intense
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oliberal economic movement. Deep-pocketed conservative institutions seized upon the intellectual movement toward free markets.260
Deregulation of the economy led to deregulation of the police.
Together, the race and class factors appear to have generated judicial obsequiousness to law enforcement. Consider that when the police were accused of using third degree tactics to obtain confessions in
the early to mid-twentieth century, law enforcement’s answer was
twofold: they didn’t use third degree tactics, and they also could not
do their jobs without third degree tactics.261 At that time, the Court
did not believe the denial, and regulated police tactics.262 Today, the
Court seems to accept both sides of the police response to the charge
of using inappropriate tactics. It supports the idea that excessive force
is not a significant problem263 yet also implicitly considers it necessary
to allow police to use excessive force.264 The Court’s deference to the
police can be read as a belief that the police must be granted whatever
tools they feel they need.
In an unpublished manuscript, criminal procedure scholar Eric
Miller discusses the Court’s general deregulation of criminal procedure.265 He stresses that from the late 1930s through the 1960s, the
Court had operated in terms of a rule-based, due process-oriented
model of regulation.266 But then the post-Warren Courts moved to a
“bottom-up, rather than top-down discretion.”267 That is, they deferred to police expertise rather than imposing standards of constitutional behavior.268 For Miller, then, “The Court’s deregulatory method
is to: (1) establish that some constitutional right applies but then
(2) delegate enforcement elsewhere, so long as (3) the official
manifests some not-incompetent response . . . .”269 This Article agrees
opposition to the Supreme Court’s expansion of the constitutional rights of accused criminals.”);
Cooper, supra note 28, at 47–53.
260 Id. at 49–50.
261 See LEO, supra note 242, at 43, 45.
262 See id. at 45.
263 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 589–90 (2006) (lauding increasing police professionalism as a purportedly sufficient bulwark against police abuse).
264 See id. at 594 (endorsing police abuse of police shooters).
265 Eric J. Miller, De-Regulating Criminal Procedure 2 (undated, unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
266 See id.
267 Id.
268 See id.; see also Obasogie & Newman, supra note 19, at 427, 444–45 (defining “the endogenous Fourth Amendment” as federal courts allowing police to make “constitutional rules
for themselves” by “ceding to police understandings of excessive force in defining the scope of
Fourth Amendment protections” (emphasis omitted)).
269 Miller, supra note 265, at 4.
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with Miller but accentuates the fact that this is not so much a deregulation of criminal procedure as a deregulation of the police, which
necessarily required a general deregulation of criminal procedure.
In accord with this deregulation of policing thesis is legal scholar
Anna Lvovsky, who has argued that courts have created a police-asexperts narrative.270 The courts moved from sometimes accepting police officers as experts on certain vice issues to taking them to be experts on all suppression issues.271 Simultaneously, police departments
engaged in a move toward greater professionalism than the departments that had regularly engaged in third degree interrogations. But
this consisted at least as much of a publicity campaign to endear themselves to the judiciary as of real change.272 The concerted campaign
included techniques such as inviting judges to tour police academies.273 Eventually, courts began seeing police officers as experts on
all things law enforcement.274 Lvovsky correctly characterizes this
trend as “undercut[ting] a core safety net against overdeference in the
Fourth Amendment context.”275
We should think of judicial overdeferrence to police as deregulation because that helps link weak use of force doctrine to economic
incentives. As the neoliberal movement toward small government (really, government reprioritized toward global business interests) took
hold, so too did a smaller judicial role. Those trends are related. The
centaur state’s creation of a deregulated economy produces a precariat that cannot be managed through the shrinking social safety net,
and thus incentivizes hyper-incarceration. The precariat must either
accept low-wage, low-security jobs or be warehoused through imprisonment. Deregulating the police accomplishes the goal of warehousing economic resisters. Section III.B will show that deregulation of the
police has also led to the warrior style of policing.

270

See Lvovsky, supra note 42, at 2018–19, 2028–29.

R

See id. (connecting these trends); see also Seth Stoughton, Evidentiary Rulings as Police
Reform, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. 429 (2015) (proposing altering evidence law as means of police
reform).
271

272

See Lvovsky, supra note 42, at 2008–11 (discussing professionalism movement).

273

Id. at 2010–11.

274

See id. at 2070–71.

Id. at 2071. Even in a strong critique of Lvovsky’s piece, legal scholar Barry Friedman
agrees, “It is a very, very serious problem. Judicial deference to police expertise has caused a
soup of societal deference to the police, which has led to vast overpolicing.” Barry Friedman,
Response, Why Do Courts Defer to Cops?, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 323, 330 (2017).
275
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B. Race, Class, and the Warrior Mindset
The police are increasingly being thought of as divided by a warrior mindset versus a guardian mindset. This way of thinking about
policing emphasizes the importance of a law enforcement officer’s
psychological inclinations about how to police.276 A recent study by
criminologists Kyle McLean, Scott E. Wolfe, Jeff Rojek, Geoffrey P.
Alpert, and Michael R. Smith found the warrior and guardian constructs to be distinct.277 In short, warrior cops see themselves as more
endangered by the communities they patrol and are more prone to see
righteous violence as a solution to noncompliance.278 Guardian police
officers see themselves as more in partnership with communities and
turn to communication as a means of persuading civilians to comply.279
The question at hand is: Why is warrior policing concentrated upon
poor black and brown communities?
1. Understanding the Warrior Cop Mentality
The contrast figure for the warrior cop is the guardian officer.
Guardian police officers view their authority as emanating from the
consent of the public and stress the use of communication skills rather
than physical force.280 Qualities of the guardian include (1) respect for
human dignity, (2) empathy, (3) patience, (4) inclusivity, and (5) introspection.281 Although the warrior and guardian mindsets can coexist in
one officer,282 police excessive force is most related to the warrior cop
mentality.283 Hence, we need to better understand what motivates the
warrior mindset.
Policing scholar and former police officer Seth Stoughton identifies four aspects of the warrior mentality. First is honor, the pursuit of
McLean et al., supra note 1, at 1098.
See id. at 1108, 1110 (determining that “the argument that there is little distinction between the warrior and guardian mindsets is incorrect,” but also noting that the two constructs
are “distinct, but not mutually exclusive”).
278 See Stoughton, supra note 1, at 612 (“It has promoted a self-image of officers as soldiers
on the front lines in the never-ending battle to preserve order and civilization against the forces
of chaos and criminality . . . .); id. at 634 (discussing belief in “the gift of aggression”).
279 See id. at 667 (identifying the guardian mindset as emphasizing community partnership);
McLean et al., supra note 1, at 1104 (asserting the guardian mindset prioritizes communication
and de-escalation).
280 McLean et al., supra note 1, at 1097.
281 Stoughton, supra note 1, at 668.
282 See McLean et al., supra note 1, at 1108, 1110.
283 See Stoughton, supra note 1, at 634 (discussing warrior mentality’s proclivity for
violence).
276
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right over wrong.284 That approach turns on the idea that law enforcement is engaged in “never-ending battle to preserve order and civilization against the forces of chaos and criminality.”285 With warriors
believing they serve “as the line between good and evil,” it should be
no surprise they feel their job makes them honorable.286 They come to
believe their self-created press clippings that they are the “thin blue
line” holding back the barbarian hordes.287
There are several race-class dimensions of the thin blue line attitude. Foremost in the thin blue line narrative is racial bifurcation. Almost everybody knows the police are mostly white and that they
concentrate on black and brown neighborhoods.288 The obvious implication of the thin blue line narrative is that law enforcement serves
the function of separating black and brown people from whites. From
the point of view of class analysis, the police do indeed preserve order,
the order dictated by capitalist elites. The police can serve as a buffer
between the rich and the poor by protecting property. In the warrior
mindset, this role is elevated as the need for order is magnified and
internalized. When the police manage boundaries between rich white
neighborhoods and poor black and brown ones, their sense of honor
allows them to take pride in their role.
This leads to the second component of the warrior mindset: duty.
Warrior cops view the job as a calling.289 That means they can feel
special for doing this job. Indeed, being part of an exclusive club is an
important aspect of law enforcement’s appeal.290 As a consequence,
they often see themselves as separate from the communities they ostensibly serve. The job-as-calling attitude fosters a sense of self that is
superior to civilians.
The primary way the race-class structure is reflected in the warrior cop’s sense of duty is in their attraction to being part of an exclusive club. The police are primarily drawn from white communities, not
284

Id. at 632–33.

285

Id. at 612.

286

McLean et al., supra note 1, at 1099.

R

See Frank Rudy Cooper, Cop Fragility and Blue Lives Matter, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 621,
634–35 (discussing link between thin blue line attitude and police resistance to criticism).
287

288 See POTTER, supra note 25, at 30–31 (describing professional- and middle-classes as seeing police as working for them); Police Officers, DATA USA, https://datausa.io/profile/soc/policeofficers#demographics [https://perma.cc/UJ4X-GARH] (describing police demographics);
Cooper, supra note 287, at 654.
289

Stoughton, supra note 1, at 633.

290

See id. at 636.
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the black and brown neighborhoods that they concentrate upon.291
The job is a calling, but it is also a source of racial esteem. It primarily
involves bullying black and brown people as a means of maintaining
command presence.292 Police are also primarily drawn from the working classes, not the poor or the upper classes.293 For these police officers, the job is a stepping stool into the middle classes. Coming from
the class that is just above the poor may also lead them to feel a sense
of superiority over the poor, whom they spend most of their time
surveilling and controlling. Given the phenomenon of fear of falling
down a peg in the class system, one would expect working-class cops
to have heightened resentment of the poor.294 The job is a calling, but
one with race-class benefits.
The third component of the warrior mindset is resolve, which requires having the mental strength to sustain endless war.295 The very
training of police, both formal and informal, suggests they are soldiers
in a war. The job-as-calling attitude can support a view of civilians as
“know-nothings,” a belief discovered in earlier studies of police culture.296 Civilians are “know-nothings” because they do not see the underside of society and thus cannot understand law enforcement’s
actions.297 This view also supports a belief that the “know-nothings”
have no business telling the police how to do their job.298 Because
police see themselves as the experts in crime-fighting, they can come
to see themselves as “beyond reproach.”299 As was noted in Section
III.A, the police have succeeded in getting the judiciary to defer to
their expertise.
The fact that the police resolve to do the job their way implicitly
accepts that there is a race-class structure. It implies that the poor
black and brown people, whom the police most often surveil and control, need to be disciplined with a strong hand. That is the most logical
motivation for their racial profiling and disproportionate uses of force
against poor racial minorities. The police display their resolve when
291 See Cooper, supra note 23, at 725–26 (noting disconnect between who polices and who
is policed).
292 See id. at 674–75 (discussing importance of command presence to policing).
293 Id. at 692.
294 See id. at 691 (explaining that working class men exhibit hypermasculinity by belittling
or harassing weaker, lower-class men as an attempt to regain social status).
295 Stoughton, supra note 1, at 633–34.
296 McLean, supra note 1, at 1099.
297 See id.
298 See id.; see also Cooper, supra note 287, at 639 (linking police resistance to criticism to
cop fragility).
299 McLean, supra note 1, at 1099.
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they explicitly or implicitly tell the “know-nothings” that, having instructed the police to maintain order, they should stay out of the way
of police.300 The police thus steel themselves to control the underworld by any means necessary.
A fourth component of the warrior mindset, therefore, is righteous violence. Warriors must be willing to use aggression to accomplish their goals.301 Warrior cops believe force is often necessary to do
the job. For example, the McLean, Wolfe, Rojek, Alpert, and Smith
study found a significant cohort of police officers who agreed with the
statement, “It is sometimes necessary to use more force than is technically allowable.”302 Further, even though the warrior and guardian
mindsets sometimes coexist, “Only the warrior construct . . . was associated with greater prioritization of physical control.”303
This fourth component is underwritten by the police role as
buffer between racial minorities and whites as well as the rich and the
poor. Seeing their role as “the Thin Blue Line” between mainstream
society and the underworld empowers police officers’ uses of force.304
The “know-nothings” in the middle and upper classes may be out of
touch, but the police are there to protect society from the underworld.305 Police targeting of poor black and brown neighborhoods tells
you who they think is the group that needs to be preserved and from
whom they must be protected.
Finally, this Article’s focus on the intersection of race and class
allows us to extricate a fifth component of the warrior cop’s mentality—belief in the inevitability of evil. This belief is why they see a
need for righteous violence—sometimes expressed as excessive
force—in the first place.306 Stoughton crystalizes the problem with an
assumption of evil: “[O]fficers separate themselves and the darkness
of their working reality from real society—they are on the fringes, in
the trenches, fighting the disorder that threatens to spill over to the
‘good’ neighborhoods and the families that are worth protecting.”307
300 See id. The warrior mentality leads police to become resistant to criticism. Stoughton,
supra note 1, at 662–66. Elsewhere, I have described this as “cop fragility,” which is their sense
that only the police can judge the validity of their actions and a concomitant digging in against
critics. Cooper, supra note 287, at 648.
301 Stoughton, supra note 1, at 634.
302 McLean et al., supra note 1, at 1105.
303 Id. at 1110.
304 Stoughton, supra note 1, at 638.
305 See McLean et al., supra note 1, at 1099 (discussing police self-conceptions).
306 See Stoughton, supra note 1, at 634 (discussing righteous violence).
307 Id. at 638.

R
R
R
R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-6\GWN603.txt

1500

unknown

Seq: 49

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

9-DEC-21

12:30

[Vol. 89:1452

That statement of a fifth component of the warrior mindset should be
chilling, for it has several negative implications for how the police see
the people they police.
First, the statement suggests that members of law enforcement
believe that the poor racial minority neighborhoods they patrol are
inherently bad, a cancerous chaos that they must stop from spreading
into “good” white neighborhoods. To those who follow this view, the
communities that law enforcement most frequently patrol are seemingly full of savages with whom police battle for the maintenance of
civilization. This view justifies the oft-held, even more often claimed,
police belief that danger lurks around every corner.308 If the threat of
violent noncompliance is thought to be nascent in every situation, police will always stand ready with responsive violence. This constant
vigilance cannot help but put them on edge and leave them always
coiled to strike.
An additional problem with belief in the inevitability of evil is
that it easily rationalizes police misconduct—including excessive
force—as a necessary means of fighting the “war” on crime.309 Because this is a war of right and wrong, attempts to constrain police
behavior can be seen as obstacles to be overcome.310 If criminals represent evil, they can be fought by any means necessary. The belief in
evil rationalizes in advance police uses of excessive force.
Finally, the transformation of crime control into a battle of good
and evil fits the neoliberal blueprint. Neoliberalism translates a lack of
economic success into a moral failing.311 The warrior cop’s belief in the
inevitability of evil translates petty crimes into moral failings. The precariat thus become blameworthy for their status as such, and the warrior cop’s willingness to use excessive force serves the purpose of
keeping this incipient evil at bay.
2. “New Policing” as Warrior Policing
The “new policing” uses Terry stops and pretextual arrests to regulate who belongs in particular neighborhoods.312 The “new policing”
is “a mixture of ‘community policing,’ problem-solving theory, and
See id. at 639–40.
See id. at 658–62 (connecting warrior mentality to police misconduct).
310 See id. at 658.
311 See supra Section II.C (explicating neoliberal ideas).
312 See I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 60–72
(2009) (discussing how pretextual stops are used to regulate boundaries between racial
neighborhoods).
308
309
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preventive hot-spots policing.”313 That means police are supposed to
get out into the community to interact with suspects.314 It also assumes
law enforcement will be using data-driven techniques to determine
how to deploy officers.315 More specifically, it usually comes in the
form of aggressively stopping and frisking suspects in areas where
crime is believed to be most likely to occur.316 Analysis of the Sandra
Bland story helps illustrate how the “new policing” is related to the
warrior mindset.
White police officer Brian Encinia saw black woman Sandra
Bland driving near the historically black college campus, where she
had just gotten a job, and had a feeling that she might be a drug mule,
but he lacked even reasonable suspicion that his hunch was true.317
Based on techniques taught to law enforcement throughout the country, Encinia took advantage of the Whren pretext doctrine by following Bland closely until she committed a traffic violation of failing to
signal a lane change.318 So he stopped Bland.319 When Encinia ordered
Bland to put out her cigarette, things quickly got out of hand.320 Encinia proceeded to order Bland to exit her car and threatened to “light
[her] up!” with a stun gun.321 Bland was reported to be found hung
dead in her cell two days later.322
Social critic Malcolm Gladwell is correct that the Bland confrontation resulted from “proactive policing” tactics often associated with
the “new policing.”323 Police are taught to force encounters with suspicious people by turning their hunches into pretextual arrests and,
sometimes, searches incident to arrest.324 They are then to watch for
313 Bell, supra note 31, at 690 n.185 (2020) (citing Heymann, supra note 30, at 422–40). The
features of the “new policing,” being about twenty years old, are not really “new,” but describe
the premises of most contemporary policing.
314 Id. at 711.
315 See id. at 714–16; Rachel A. Harmon & Andrew Manns, Proactive Policing and the
Legacy of Terry, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 49, 57 (2017).
316 See Harmon & Manns, supra note 315, at 56. (“The newer forms of proactive strategies
are premised on the idea that, if the desirable outcome of policing is public safety and order,
officers should be out there preventing problems from emerging, not just stopping them when
they do.”).
317 GLADWELL, supra note 232, at 2–4, 324–26.
318 Id.
319 Id. at 2.
320 Id.
321 Id. at 4.
322 Id.
323 Id. at 324–26; see also Harmon & Manns, supra note 315, at 56 (discussing effects of
proactive policing).
324 See Gladwell, supra note 232, at 321.
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“curiosity ticklers” that suggest something is awry.325 Encinia was doing the job as intended by higher-ups when he followed Bland based
on a mere hunch—the insufficient suspiciousness of her having out-ofstate license plates.326 He was also doing as he had been taught by
asserting control over Bland.327 Bland’s death was thus an outgrowth
of preventive and proactive policing. Regardless of how exactly Bland
died days later, Encinia’s use of “new policing” techniques was a butfor cause of her death. Proactive policing led Encinia to stop Bland for
no good reason; the stop led to her getting dead.
Encinia’s actions are consistent with the warrior mindset. He felt
duty-bound to force encounters. He also felt entitled to use righteous
violence to enforce his commands. He likely thought Bland to be a
drug mule because of her race. He also seems to have considered her
car’s undistinguished status and clutter to have been signs of her being
a drug mule.328 That is an assumption that overlaps substantially with
class. Gladwell goes so far as to say the primary problem with Encinia
stopping Bland was that she was not in a “high crime area.”329 In that
sense, however, Gladwell tacitly endorses warrior policing and merely
opposes its application in respectable neighborhoods.330
As Gladwell’s focus on “high crime areas” would suggest, the
predictive nature of the “new policing” creates race-class problems.
The practice of using past arrest statistics to determine future police
assignments is bound to result in overpolicing of poor black and
brown neighborhoods. There is a “ratchet effect” whereby past arrests
based on bias magnify the racial profiling problem as police then use
the biased arrest statistics to choose where to look for future crime.331
That means predictive policing will lock in past racial bias and justify
further racial profiling, usually against neighborhoods that are also
poor. This tendency of predictive policing toward racial profiling was
amply demonstrated by the comprehensive study that led to the banning of racial profiling in New York City.332 The Floyd Court made
findings of fact that the NYPD both had a policy of stopping young
325

See id.

326

See id. at 325.

327

See id. at 333–34.

328

See id. at 323 (noting factors police use to suspect drug mules).

329

Id. at 340–42.

330

See id. (questioning use of proactive policing tactics in the particular location).

See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015) (critiquing predictive policing methods).
331

332

See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d. 540, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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black and brown males and based its decisions of where to allocate
police officers on that goal.333
It is important to note that the “new policing” is born of and facilitates the drive toward boundary management. Predictive policing
easily lends itself to the goal of rounding up the usual (racial minority)
suspects. We would also expect racial profiling to be especially vigorous in poor neighborhoods, which are less able to defend themselves
through political power.334
C. Boundary Management
Section III.C highlights ways that excessive force doctrine and the
“new policing” through warrior cop methods lead to police boundary
management along intersecting lines of race and class. Simply, the police execute their duties differently in different neighborhoods.335 To
understand which locations will get which types of policing, it is helpful to link the warrior and guardian qualities to other dichotomies.
Police tend to operate as warriors in ghettos and guardians in gated
communities.336 They are more likely to act as warriors against black
and brown people and to greet white people as guardians.337 The poor
get warrior policing, the rich get guardians. Put simply, the police do
not police the same in rich white neighborhoods as they do in poor
black and brown communities.338 This Section identifies ways that poSee id. at 562.
See POTTER, supra note 25, at 31–32 (describing poor people’s relation to police).
335 Police also treat different people differently. I have long since tired of asking my white
female students how police treat them when they are traffic stopped. When they are young, and
especially if they are conventionally deemed attractive, they have many stories of being given
warnings instead of tickets. My female students of color have far fewer such stories. As a black
male, I experienced my first “I’m just going to give you a warning” well into my forties. Certainly
not all women or white women or conventionally attractive women receive preferential treatment in traffic stops. Nonetheless, although this is anecdotal evidence of disparate policing, it is
consistent with many people’s understandings of how police operate. See, e.g., I. India Thusi, On
Beauty and Policing, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1335, 1375–76 (2020) (asserting qualitative study shows
“the police officers seemed to commodify beauty in a way that correlated with how and where
they targeted policing efforts across the various red-light districts”).
336 See generally Stoughton, supra note 1, at 612–14, 634 (distinguishing warrior and guardian policing); Capers, supra note 312, at 60–72 (discussing disparate policing by neighborhood
and race); Bell, supra note 31, at 650, 696–98 (describing police as enforcing segregation).
337 See sources cited supra note 336.
338 Disparate policing stems in part from the advent of the predictive aspect of policing,
which expanded its scope. From the Terry opinion forward, the Court has endorsed stopping
criminals before they commit crime. Although there is some logic to the idea that police need
not stand idly by while a crime is being committed, the preventive approach can go too far. The
police are now empowered to proactively seek out crime. Given the realities of police explicit
and implicit racial bias, it is inevitable that seeking out crime will result in disparate policing of
333
334
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lice excessive force functions to maintain boundaries between neighborhoods defined as rich, white, and “good” and those defined as
poor, black or brown, and “bad.”
Legal scholar and sociologist Monica C. Bell’s recent article,
Anti-Segregation Policing, provides evidence of police boundary management.339 She details “[m]echanisms of [p]ro-[s]egregation
[p]olicing,” which demonstrate that “forms and qualities of policing
are intimately linked with neighborhood characteristics, especially but
not exclusively neighborhood racial composition and poverty
levels.”340 Bell’s contribution is to demonstrate that “geographically
concentrated, intensive, prevention-focused policing”341—the “new
policing”—reinforces residential race-class segregation.342 Although
Bell focuses on how the police reinforce the pernicious effects of the
United States’ long history of residential segregation, this Article puts
emphasis on how these policing tactics are linked to both the warrior
mindset and incentives provided by the class-race structure.
A fundamental piece of the “new policing” is the saturation of
particular black and brown neighborhoods.343 The programmatic stop
and frisk practices of the “new policing” mean that police will have
frequent contact with young black and brown people in the targeted
neighborhoods.344 It is this racially disparate saturation that reinforces
segregation, for it identifies poor black and brown neighborhoods as
“high crime areas,” which makes the housing less desirable.345 The undesirability of the housing has negative effects on poor racial minorities: “When groups of people are cordoned off into stigmatized places,
‘correlated adversity’ or ‘compounded deprivation’ emerges, affecting
racial minorities. That point was made by the NAACP in its Terry amicus brief and admitted, but
sidestepped in the opinion itself. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (arguing Court is
“powerless” to stop police harassment of racial minorities); Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 4–5, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
(No. 63), 1967 WL 113672, at *4–5 (arguing stop and frisk disproportionately visited upon
blacks). One way the police use their expanded preventive powers is to force contacts with
vaguely suspicious people. As critical race theorist, criminal procedure scholar, and law professor Devon Carbado notes, those excess contacts lead to a higher risk that racial minorities will be
victims of police excessive force. Carbado, supra note 20, at 1491–93.
339 Bell, supra note 31 at 687–88.
340 Id.
341 Id. at 690.
342 Id. at 653.
343 See Carbado, supra note 20, at 1490–95 (contending certain racially defined areas receive more aggressive policing).
344 See Cooper, supra note 28, at 18 (“The fourth key characteristic of programmatic stop
and frisk is further micro-targeting of young black and Latinx males in urban environments. ”).
345 See Capers, supra note 312, at 55.
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family formation, school test scores, mental and physical health,
crime, employment, and even speech patterns.”346 Intensive policing
thus marks neighborhoods as “bad,” leaving them increasingly black,
brown, and poor.347 Police saturation of poor black and brown neighborhoods has the aforementioned “ratchet effect”: it increases the
number of arrests that will be made in those neighborhoods, thus allowing police to rationalize more saturation policing there in the
future.348
Meanwhile, in rich white neighborhoods, police boundary management supplements private white boundary management. The police concentrate on surveilling and controlling people who are racially
or otherwise “out of place.”349 Such boundary management is a key
part of what police do. Hence, Bell labels keeping racial minorities out
of white neighborhoods a “core aspect” of policing.350 Police boundary
management also supplements what critical race theorist Addie
Rolnick calls “defending white space.”351 Civilians in rich white spaces
spend a lot of time monitoring the presence and actions of black and
brown people. For instance, this is what the killers of Ahmaud Arbery
were doing.352 Whites also simply call the police to have black and
brown people punished for small infractions. The phenomenon is so
346 Bell, supra note 31, at 672 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Matthew Desmond &
Bruce Western, Poverty in America: New Directions and Debates, 44 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 305,
308–09 (2018); and then quoting Kristin L. Perkins & Robert J. Sampson, Compounded Deprivation in the Transition to Adulthood: The Intersection of Racial and Economic Inequality Among
Chicagoans, 1995-2013, RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCIS., Nov. 2015, at 1, 35). But, to the
extent that neighborhood effects produce greater crime, the society that segregates these people
and then overpolices them may be morally responsible for the effect. See David L. Bazelon, The
Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 388 (1976) (arguing that a decision to
convict should include a determination of whether “society’s own conduct in relation to the actor
entitles it to sit in condemnation of him with respect to the condemnable act” (footnote
omitted)).
347 See Bell, supra note 31, at 653, 672.
348 This is not to say that saturation policing is actually justified. It is based on a double
misrepresentation: crime numbers produced by racial profiling are used to rationalize saturating
neighborhoods, which then do become more crime-prone, allowing further rationalization of
more saturation, and so on. Moreover, because there is crime everywhere in the United States,
choosing where to look for it games the system. Imagine that police swept college dorms for
illegal drug use. Would we then hear about the need to target rich white kids?
349 See Capers, supra note 312, at 62, 66 (“Our methods of policing also serve to limn out
and maintain racialized spaces.”).
350 Bell, supra note 31, at 696 (calling pushing out racial minorities a “core aspect[] of
police work”).
351 Addie C. Rolnick, Defending White Space, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1639 passim (2019)
(discussing ways private violence protects white space).
352 See Chang et al., supra note 41, at 48 (noting killers’ claim that they were investigating
local crimes).
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pervasive it has a name: “white caller crime.”353 The cofacilitators of
the Program on Race, Gender & Policing at the University of Nevada,
Las Vegas, Stewart Chang, myself, and Rolnick, have analyzed a recent spate of killings of blacks in order to demonstrate that there is a
“cycle of violence” against black and brown people that cuts across
multiple domains.354
The “new policing” is also class-based in that its aggressive methods are primarily applied in poor neighborhoods. In fact, “[e]conomic
separation has drastically increased, with the well-off corralling themselves into enclaves of increasingly concentrated affluence.”355 Indeed,
some scholars argue that class is more important than race in the distribution of aggressive policing.356 Further, the neighborhoods that get
the “new policing” are defined not just by race, but by poverty.357 At
the least, warrior tactics are behaviors more easily imposed on the
poor, who are not often politically empowered to resist unwanted
policies.358
The “new policing” differentiates rich white neighborhoods from
poor black and brown ones on the basis of both race and class. This
Article adds to Bell’s point about policing and racial segregation by
highlighting the way warrior policing is the means of marking poor
black and brown neighborhoods as disfavored. The “new policing”
lends itself to warrior policing. The warrior’s sense of honor is linked
to serving as the “thin blue line” between order and chaos.359 The
“new policing” accepts “thin blue line” reasoning by saturating poor
black and brown neighborhoods. As the example of Summerlin and
the Westside in Las Vegas demonstrates, saturation in “tha ‘hood”
means fewer resources for surveillance and control in “the ‘burbs.”360
That is not to say there is no policing in the suburbs, but it is a friendlier policing.
353 See generally Chan Tov McNamarah, White Caller Crime: Racialized Police Communication and Existing While Black, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335 (2019) (detailing incidents of white
civilians regulating perceived black misbehavior).
354 Chang et al., supra note 41, at 4–5 (referencing “cycle of violence”); see also Carbado,
supra note 40, at 128 (referring to “circuits of violence”).
355 Bell, supra note 31, at 662.
356 See Reed Collins, Note, Strolling While Poor: How Broken-Windows Policing Created a
New Crime in Baltimore, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 419, 426 (2007).
357 See Bell, supra note 31, at 732 (“Segregation creates a dynamic in which communities
that are largely Black and largely poor are viewed as in need of ‘special’ forms of governance.”).
358 See id. at 732–33.
359 McLean et al., supra note 1, at 1099.
360 But see supra note 16 (noting Bell’s declaration there is sometimes more policing in
suburbs).
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Ultimately, warrior policing as boundary management leads to
disproportionate police excessive force against poor black and brown
people. The key to the violence is the warrior cop’s belief in the inevitability of evil. The warrior cop believes they are the “thin blue line”
between chaos and order. They believe the people whose neighborhoods they patrol—poor black and brown people—are the chaos. The
chaos rationalizes a willingness to use righteous violence. Being on
edge for evil from these people, police are trigger happy. Consequently, boundary management by the application of “new policing”
methods with a warrior policing mindset should be expected to lead to
disproportionate excessive force against poor black and brown
people.361
IV.

OBJECTIONS

AND

IMPLICATIONS

This Article proposes a different scholarly approach to policing.
Considering warrior cops’ uses of force as boundary management between rich white neighborhoods and poor black and brown ones illustrates the utility of applying intersectionality theory to policing. First,
we must note that the police and courts are affected by incentives created by the United States’ neoliberal centaur state.362 Most notable
amongst those incentives for our purposes is the creation of a precariat who tend to be managed through the criminalization system.
Second, we can then note the warrior cop’s feelings of a duty to serve
as the “thin blue line” between order and chaos by means of an assumption of evil and a willingness to use righteous violence. The “new
policing,” especially in its preventive and predictive techniques, encourages warrior behaviors.363 Finally, because boundary management
between rich white neighborhoods and poor black and brown ones is a
core function of policing, it becomes unsurprising that poor black and
brown people get warrior policing.364 Warrior policing leads to disparate policing, including through the differential application of excessive force to poor black and brown people.
A potential objection to this analysis is that this Article does not
prove that police treat rich blacks and browns or poor whites differently than poor blacks and browns. It is true that this Article has not
tried to address all potential facets of class and policing, but it does
not need to do so. The argument here demonstrates the general utility
361
362
363
364

See
See
See
See

Carbado, supra note 20, at 1491–92.
supra Section II.C (explicating concept of centaur state).
supra Section III.B (discussing effects of warrior/guardian policing dichotomy).
supra Section III.C (linking police enforcement of segregation to warrior mode).
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of intersectionality theory and class analysis by showing that neoliberalism incentivizes the warrior/guardian dichotomy and police boundary management between rich white neighborhoods and poor black
and brown ones. It leaves analysis of policing of the white poor and
upper-class black and brown people for future projects. It may be that
examination of those other groups will reveal somewhat different patterns of policing. This objection does not thwart this project, but it
does present a case for following up on this analysis.
Another potential objection is that neoliberalism does not create
crime and is thus morally neutral. First, the premise may be incorrect.
Bell and others have argued that isolating people in ghettoes leads to
negative consequences, including heightened crime.365 Indeed, neoliberalism’s fostering of a precariat class practically guarantees there
will be “stigmatized places”366 characterized by “compounded deprivation.”367 To the extent that neighborhood effects produce greater
crime, the society that segregates these people and then overpolices
them may be morally responsible for the effect.368
Moreover, neoliberalism is hardly morally neutral when it comes
to crime. Neoliberalism’s drive for ever-increasing profit by means of
deregulating businesses and cutting social welfare spawns a precariat.
Except during times of an unusually expansive economy, when the
precariat serve as needed surplus labor,369 something must be done
with them. Neoliberalism’s answer is to force most of the precariat
into insecure labor and warehouse the rest in prison.370 Hyper-incarceration is one of neoliberalism’s responses to the precariat regardless
of crime levels. For example, as crime went down in the 2000s, incarceration dramatically increased.371 Far from being morally neutral as
365

Bell, supra note 31, at 672.

366

Id.

367

Id. (quoting Perkins & Sampson, supra note 346, at 35).

See Bazelon, supra note 346, at 388 (arguing that a decision to convict should include a
determination of whether “society’s own conduct in relation to the actor entitles it to sit in
condemnation of him with respect to the condemnable act” (footnote omitted)).
368

369

See Nunn, supra note 247, at 439 (defining surplus labor).

370

See supra Section II.C.

371 See generally DON STEMEN, VERA, THE PRISON PARADOX: MORE INCARCERATION
WILL NOT MAKE US SAFER (2017), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/for-the-recordprison-paradox_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLT9-XY3U]; see also Joanna Laine, From Criminalization to Humanization: Ending Discrimination Against the Homeless, 39 HARBINGER 1 (2015)
(“Americans also have an overstated fear of violent crime in general: a survey found that most
Americans believe that violent crime has increased in recent years, even though it has steadily
decreased.”).
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to boundary management through policing, neoliberalism is an important cause thereof.
Over and above allowing critique of the United States’ centaur
state, applying intersectionality theory to policing will also open us to
other important insights. For instance, popular desire for race and
class disparities in policing can be implied from those disparities’ enduring prevalence. It should be obvious that police do not act against
the interests and will of elites.372 It takes social power to make something a law, so the police are doing what those in power wish them to
do. Just as laws are not made without the implicit support of elites,
elites cannot impose their will over the objection of a majority of the
voting population. The economic elite may heavily influence political
elites, but they cannot overcome a majority vote. Because the police
have little desire or ability to override the will of economic elites, political elites, and political majorities, we should assume that, at least
over the long run, the policing we are getting is the policing those
constituencies want.373 Sadly, that implies that many people want raceand class-differentiated policing.
Further, the deregulation of the police by the post-Warren Courts
may have an economic source: neoliberalism. Neoliberalism’s destruction of the social safety net leaves many people in precarious positions. There is thus a strong structural incentive to invent wars on
crime and other means of incapacitating people who are (economically) unwanted. Doctrinal deregulation of the police serves racialized
social control, but it also serves marginalization of the poor. Consequently, we need an intersectional analysis of policing that provides a
full account of class as well as race and other identities.
Consider as well that the centaur state’s deregulation of the police may serve the typical police officer’s class interests. That officer is
often white, but he is not rich.374 In fact, there is a thin line between
him and the poor black and brown people he spends his day arresting.
Future scholarship should compare and contrast formerly marginalized groups “class jumping” via the police force. If the police officer
needs a foil so he does not “fall” too far down the class ladder, he
finds ready-made contrast figures in the precariat.
Finally, acknowledging the link between race-class boundary
management and police excessive force reinforces the long-standing
See POTTER, supra note 25, at 32–33 (discussing social construction of crime).
See id. at 33 (pointing to power of political majorities).
374 Police Officers, DATA USA, https://datausa.io/profile/soc/police-officers#demographics
[https://perma.cc/W3Q7-M2R9].
372
373
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call for structural analysis of racism.375 Although the class structure
does not make police commit excessive force against poor racial minorities, it does channel officers’ behavior toward certain actions. So,
the Court and law enforcement officers do not need to act with purposeful intent to systematically deprive poor black and brown people
of rights.376 Instead, those actors seem to have been conscious of a risk
that deregulating the police and “new policing” tactics would lead to
disparate uses of excessive force, and to have subconsciously desired it
or simply did not care.377 In other words, the system—from political
elites who propounded the centaur state to courts that deregulated the
police to policymakers who support warrior tactics—has at least a
reckless mental state about police abuse of poor black and brown people. At every stage, social structures that are suffused with the interlocking hierarchies nudge processes, and thus individual actors,
toward particular results. This structural analysis opposes those who
would contend that police excessive force is the result of a few “bad
apples” among police.378 If we are to achieve equitable policing, we
have to fight the combined forces of the United States’ race-class
structure.
Ultimately, police officers’ physical brutality is on behalf of elites.
The Court does violence through words by deregulating, and thus rationalizing, police excessive force as a necessary part of police discretion.379 The current focus on police officers’ excessive force actually
deflects attention from elites’ structural violence against the precariat
through housing laws, environmental racism, and other forms of
white-collar crime. We should blame the United States’ adhesion to a
375 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324–26, 371 (1987) (arguing intent standard
ignores much racism).
376 Cf. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling the
Court out as fearing “too much justice” for constructing Equal Protection as requiring purposeful intent).
377 We might state this conclusion as follows:
The question is not whether the actors imbedded within these systems, or even
those who participate in their design, mean to discriminate. They may well and
likely in many circumstances do, but here the inquiry is different. If the administrative systems result in discriminatory effects, privileging some and subordinating
others, what are the mechanisms by which structural discrimination is effectuated?
Bach, supra note 44, at 501–02. That is, it does not take intentional bias and coordination to
generate disparate results. See id.
378 See, e.g., Michael Siegel, Racial Disparities in Fatal Police Shootings: An Empirical
Analysis Informed by Critical Race Theory, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1072–73 (2020) (discussing
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, WHEN POLICE KILL (2017)).
379 See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1622 (1986).
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neoliberal class structure for the violence police officers commit to
maintain the status quo—not just the racism in which the violence is
embedded.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s central insight is that incentives created by the class
structure lead police to go into warrior mode and reinforce racialized
class boundaries through excessive force. That brings us back to the
way policing is differentiated between the rich and white Summerlin,
Las Vegas and the poor and black and brown Westside of Las Vegas.
Police boundary management makes these places into “good” and
“bad” neighborhoods. An intersectional analysis of policing that considers class as well as race helps us see that phenomenon.

